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WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS AND ITS 
AFTERMATH FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 2010-2020?
 * 
Andy Sumner**, Joe Ballantyne*** and Andrew Curry*** 
 
ABSTRACT 
Some major “game changers” beyond the recent economic crisis and food/fuel crisis will have 
an impact on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to 2015 and afterwards. “Future-
proofing” the MDGs is about thinking how future(s) might impact the Goals, MDG gains, costs, 
strategies and opportunities for faster progress on poverty reduction.  
Scenarios—multiple coherent and plausible futures—are a vehicle both for acting on possible 
future(s) and interpreting their implications. This paper explores the implications for growth 
and poverty reduction in developing countries of four futures scenarios to address the 
following question: “What are the implications of the global financial crisis and its aftermath, 
regionally and globally, for developing countries, taking a 5–10 year view? 
The scenarios and modelling were developed through interviews and workshops with a range 
o f  s t a k e h o l d e r s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ,  I n dia and Kenya. This paper takes a structured 
approach to reviewing outcomes for growth, poverty reduction and the MDGs for different 
developing economies, against the background of the post-crisis context. The scenarios were 
developed using a version of the morphological scenarios approach, field anomaly relaxation 
(FAR). This creates a backdrop of internally consistent futures for policy formation and decision 
making by identifying and analysing the most significant drivers of change in the global 
financial and political systems. The scenarios are closely connected to a “soft” model that 
identifies possible pathways, causal linkages and transmission variables between the scenarios 
and associated levels of economic growth and poverty reduction via key economic variables. 
This permits more granular interpretation of the scenario outcomes than conventional 
scenario-analysis techniques. This work was funded by DFID (the futures mapping) and UNDP 
(the annex MDG review). 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Development futures mapping is an emerging area of interest in development research, as 
well as in policy in a broader sense (for examples, see Grimm et al., 2008; Hughes et al., 2008; 
Lundgaard, 2009), often specifically with regard to Africa (see Table 2 and Box 1 for examples). 
For instance, one could take those with a dedicated development angle, such as the European 
Association of Development Research and Training Institutes’ (EADI) European Development 
Cooperation 2010 and 2020 projects, the Society for International Development’s Horizon 
Scanning Project, and the Millennium Project’s Africa Foresight initiative.
1 
Arguably, this stems from a sense that the economic crisis marked the end of a benign era 
of relative stability, strong economic growth and fairly buoyant aid budgets, and ushered in a 
different post-crisis world or “new normal” that may be one of multiple and interlinked crises. 
Suffice to note here that the conclusion of the US National Intelligence Council Report (2008: 
xii), based on a widespread and large academic consultation, is sobering: “trends suggest 
major discontinuities, shocks and surprises”. 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb has popularised the thesis of “Black Swans”—unexpected, 
unpredictable and high-impact events such as the economic crisis itself. Taleb argues  
that human beings underestimate the likelihood and impact of hard-to-foresee events.  
We should not try to predict Black Swans, however, but “invest in preparedness, not in 
prediction” (Taleb, 2007: 208). In short, we can seek to identify a relatively small number  
of variables or drivers that are likely to have a disproportionate influence on future 
“development” and possible global future(s). 
2  THE POST-ECONOMIC CRISIS CONTEXT 
The MDGs comprised an approach born of a benign era of relative stability, stronger economic 
growth and fairly buoyant aid budgets. We now face a very different world. Changes sparked 
by increased uncertainty and a growing sense of multiple insecurities can have adverse 
impacts on poverty levels, and evidence is already emerging that the economic crisis  
itself is leading to significant changes in the context for development more broadly.  
•  Global governance: the move from the G8 to the G20 means that large developing 
nations have more representation and power, but changes in the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank will be crucial for wider changes in 
governance. 
•  New economic and social policies: it is probable that developing countries will be 
more inclined to explore new development models; approaches from China, the 
“Beijing Consensus”, are more likely to be taken up than Western prescriptions;  
the scale of the food and financial crises has made a powerful case for better social 
protection systems, but building a sense of ownership in governments and civil 
societies remains a challenge in securing long-term budget allocations. 
 
As Jones et al. (2009: 51) have noted: “the era in which the seven major industrial 
economies could meet with Russia and act collectively to solve global problems is over”.  
The rise of the G20 and its institutionalisation at the G20 Pittsburgh Summit as the global body 
for economic coordination marks a fundamental shift from the era in which agreement was 
reached on the MDGs, wherein the countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation Working Paper  3 
 
and Development (OECD) were the main drivers and decision makers in global economic 
affairs. The shift from the G8 to the G20 is certainly positive for developing countries’ 
representation, but it is less clear that the impact on development itself will be immediately 
beneficial. While in recent years the G8 has had Africa and the MDGs as a permanent item on 
its agenda, it has been harder to introduce issues relevant to the poorest countries, such as the 
MDGs, into the G20 discussions. Increasingly, moreover, many issues are addressed in a G2 
consisting of the United States and China. 
The G20 is evolving as the “steering committee” on global and systemic issues that 
could come to include climate, health and other matters likely to be high on the future 
international agenda. As noted, a shortcoming is the absence of representation of low-
income countries, particularly African countries, in contrast to the strong representation  
of the Asia-Pacific countries (ten of the 19 countries). The G20’s structures may also evolve. 
There are suggestions that it should move towards a constituency-based system resembling 
the model of the World Bank/IMF boards. Much will depend on how developing-country 
blocs operate politically in these new international fora, and on governance reform at the 
IMF and the World Bank (reform at both of these bodies has G20 deadlines for decisions in 
2010 and 2011). There is consensus that the heads of the two institutions should be selected 
in an open and transparent process, and should not be restricted to candidates from one 
country or region. Contention remains on the composition of quotas and boards, as these 
reflect voting strength and levels of access to resources.  
The economic context has also been shaken by the crisis, because of the uncertainties 
created by the unexpected shocks to finance and trade, as well as their knock-on effects on 
millions of lives, and the shaking of confidence in what were previously thought to be the 
certainties of economic theory and practice. The crisis was different for three reasons: its 
origins in the industrialised countries; the speed of global transmission; and the size  
of the shock. Nonetheless, not all that was expected actually happened (see Table 1). 
TABLE 1 
The Global Economic Crisis: What Happened? What Didn’t? 
What has happened in the crisis in developing countries?  What has not happened? 
Slowdown in growth rates  But no overall developing-country recession 
Fall in export volumes  But very variable  
Fall in export unit values  But main problem is rising commodity prices 
Reductions in FDI and portfolio investment  No country-specific crises as in the 1990s  
Banking problems in emerging markets.   Banking systems have held up well  
Falls in remittances affecting poorer countries  Too early to draw a definitive conclusion 
Sovereign debt increasing  Could become a major issue 
Trade credit expected to fall  Clear evidence of this problem hard to find 
Aid flows expected to fall  Some have cut, but no generalised fall  
 
On a broader policy note, the Washington Consensus has been declared dead (again) but 
the nature of the shift to a “Beijing Consensus” or model (meaning a greater role for state-led 
or state-managed global integration) and policy experimentation is still unclear. The IMF 
(2010a; 2010b; 2010c) most recently has questioned inflation targeting and capital controls, 
and has raised the prospect of new financial and bank taxes. Further, the discussion of “global 
economic imbalances” at the G20, and the resulting agreement that governments have a role 4  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
in directing markets in order to avoid “imbalances”, would have been an unthinkable break 
with the orthodoxy just a few years ago. If it opens up discussion of a wider range of policy 
instruments for development, it will have value. As noted above, however, it is far from certain 
that the change in language in G20 declarations and on the pages of the Financial Times will 
have any long-term impact on policy.  
A further change is the continuing economic uncertainty caused by the crisis itself—it is 
not clear when or if growth rates in the poorest countries will start to pick up, and whether the 
poorest people will benefit in time to prevent permanent damage to livelihoods and the erosion 
of assets. In terms of recovery and the fiscal outlook, there are various concerns regarding the 
speed of the recovery, fiscal space, and impacts on public expenditure, social spending and debt 
service, which are highly country-specific. Global growth is clear enough, judging by the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook estimates, and recovery is very much V-shaped in the emerging 
economies and in Africa. Martin Wolf at the Financial Times and Moisés Naim at Foreign Policy 
note the “LUV” recovery (L-shaped recovery in Europe, U-shaped in the United States, and  
V-shaped in big emerging economies), implying a fiscally constrained, indebted North and a 
dynamic set of larger emerging economies. Much depends on when the monetary and fiscal 
stimulus is withdrawn. In short, sustained recovery is not guaranteed. Continued policy efforts 
are needed to keep interest rates low, devise credible strategies for withdrawing monetary 
support, maintain the fiscal stimulus into 2010 with exit strategies, repair the financial sector  
in advanced and emerging economies, and bring about a global rebalancing of excessive 
surpluses and deficits in line with the G20 “mutual assessment programme” led by the IMF. 
Furthermore, the averages mask significant differences, and in some countries there is a 
“triple whammy” of large growth decelerations, slow recovery of growth rates and little or no 
fiscal space, particularly in Africa (half of all countries, according to some estimates). Moreover, 
a number of fragile states are in the very high-risk category of high growth deceleration, 
low/no fiscal space and three years or more to recovery. There is evidence that this will have 
MDG impacts not only on growth but also on social spending, albeit varying by country.  
Economic uncertainty in donor countries is also leading to a decline in public support for 
aid budgets. This is an immediate concern for policymakers over the next few years, and will be 
critical in determining the economic and social policy environment. 
Looking further ahead, some major “game changers” beyond the recent economic crisis 
and food/fuel crisis (see annex for further discussion) will have an impact on the MDGs to 2015 
and afterwards. One should also note the changing nature of aid itself, given the rise of “new” 
donors among the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and wider afield, as well as 
debates on climate finance that may dwarf “traditional aid” flows. Innovative financing is 
already changing the nature and structure of aid, and donors are increasingly aware of debates 
on the post-bureaucratic age. All of this indicates a political and economic environment of 
increasing uncertainty over the next decade or more, or a situation of “confronting the long 
crisis” to echo Evans et al., (2010). 
Scenarios—multiple coherent and plausible futures—are a vehicle for acting on possible 
future(s) and for interpreting their implications. To this end, The Futures Company and the 
Institute for Development Studies (IDS) collaborated on a project to develop scenarios and 
modelling in light of the global financial crisis, with a view to addressing the following 
question: “what are the implications of the global financial crisis and its aftermath, regionally 
and globally, for developing countries, taking a 5–10 year view? The scenarios and modelling 
were developed through interviews and workshops with a range of stakeholders in the 
United Kingdom, India and Kenya. Working Paper  5 
 
TABLE 2 
Examples of African Futures Mapping 
Country/horizon  Methodology and key drivers  Scenario narratives 
East Africa/2040  Scenario paper 
 
1. Natural and resource wealth. 
2. Rural/urban disparities; migration. 
3. Violence/war (or threat thereof). 
4. Effects of climate change/environmental damage. 
5. Political stability. 
6. Crime and unemployment. 
“I want to be a star”: the region is so 
spellbound by the promise of resource wealth 
that it welcomes all suitors and cedes control 
of its future. 
“I want a visa”: East Africa’s executive elite, 
motivated by enlightened self-interest, deploys 
its intellectual skills and state power to deliver 
development. It also finds that a confidence in 
control can only take one so far and that it 
faces stark decisions. 
Usiniharakishe (don’t rush me): the region’s 
countries struggle to retain and reclaim control 
over their most local assets—land, water, 
trees, creativity—in an effort to determine their 
own futures. The land slowly heals over time 
and biodiversity reaches record levels. 
Kenya/2020  30 researchers developing scenarios in a period of 
more than a year, in between five workshops. 
 
1. Violence and erosion of cultural values. 
2. Unemployment. 
3. Lack of government legitimacy and weak 
institutions. 
4. Mistrust of the judiciary.  
5. Decreased agricultural productivity and an 
uncompetitive manufacturing sector. 
6. Poor infrastructure and utilities. 
El Niño scenario: total breakdown of Kenya as 
it is today.  
Maendeleo scenario: initial rapid economic 
gains but the country is full of inequalities and 
instability, without political reform.  
Katiba scenario: institutional (political) reform 
without substantial economic transformation.  
Flying geese scenario: political, social and 
economic reform leading to inclusive 
democracy and growth. 
Rwanda/2025 Conversation-based,  convening with key individuals 
from Rwanda and other countries  
(scenario development). 
 
1. Lack of freedom of speech and erosion of civil 
liberties. 
2. Lack of political progress (pro-forma consultations 
without implementing reforms). 
3. Sluggish private sector because of bureaucracy. 
4. Stagnating economy. 
5. Involvement in regional conflicts. 
Visionary scenario: Kigali is a thriving tourist 
destination and capital, with direct flights to all 
major global cities, children are in school. 
Years of attracting foreign investment and 
streamlining bureaucratic processes have 
been effective. 
Alternative scenario: Rwanda is run by 
“benevolent” but strong-armed government, 
recognised as doing a good job and rewarded 
for its governance style; other East African 
Community (EAC) leaders may emerge and 
take on this style of governing. 
Uganda/2025  50 people from different professions and 
backgrounds; conversations and investigations in 
order to understand what has led to Uganda’s 
current state. This was carried out over 18 months 
and sought to identify the factors that are influencing 
the future, as well as to map what future Ugandans 
are facing potentially. 
 
1. Intransigence of the political elite in power and 
their role in collapsing avenues for dialogue. 
2. Deepening of poverty and social exclusion. 
3. Greed and callousness of the political and 
business elites.  
4. Legacy of violence, conflict and mistrust. 
5. Fear of renewed conflict as a result of the 
transition failing. 
6. A shared vision that Uganda can be  
“bigger and better”. 
Rope bridge: legitimacy of government 
dependent on its fostering national consensus 
and tackling pressing problems within society. 
Ow’embaliga: displacement, disparity and 
disintegration. 
Ovago Vile Vile: national unity; 
reconciliation, renewal and reconstruction.  
Sources:   Rwanda: <http://www.scenariodevelopment.com/Future_of_Rwanda>;  
Kenya: <http://www.kenyascenarios.org/default.html>;  
Uganda:< http://www.scenarios.ws/uganda/>;  
Horn of Africa futures: <http://www.sidint.net/sid-first-trend-monitoring-report-greater-horn-of-east-africa/>. 6  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
BOX 1 
Over the next 20 years, what factors will drive Africa and the world’s responses to the AIDS 
epidemic, and what kind of future will there be for the next generation?  
Three scenarios for HIV/AIDS in Africa to 2025: 
Tough choices: Africa takes a stand 
In this scenario, African leaders take tough measures that reduce the spread of HIV in the long 
term, even if it means difficulties in the short term. The key message is that Africa can lay the 
foundation for future growth and development, and reduce the incidence of HIV by means of 
increased government involvement and coordination, a more coherent strategy (emphasising 
both prevention and the scaling-up of antiretroviral therapy), greater HIV/AIDS spending (of about 
US$100 billion) and a sharper focus on children orphaned by AIDS. But there will continue to be a 
high number of deaths (which will begin to fall by 2015) and a doubling in the number of children 
orphaned by AIDS, since prevention measures will take time to work through the system. 
Traps and legacies: the whirlpool 
This is a story about the deepening of AIDS, poverty, and marginalisation because of a series  
of seven traps that prevent all but a few nations/privileged segments of the population from 
escaping continuing poverty and HIV prevalence. The epidemic will thus continue because:  
HIV is seen in isolation from its root social, economic and political contexts; resources provision  
is inconsistent and unpredictable over the next 20 years; African countries fail to translate the 
aspirations of pan-African unity into effective reality; donors do not harmonise their responses; aid 
is volatile and of poor quality; antiretroviral drugs are easier to access than adequate nutrition and 
clean water; the realities of human behaviour are denied; and the root causes of poverty are not 
addressed. In this scenario, by 2025 HIV prevalence is similar to that of today (at about 5 per cent  
of the adult population); the cumulative number of people dying from AIDS increases more than 
fourfold; and the number of children orphaned by the epidemic continues to rise beyond 2025. 
Times of transition: Africa overcomes 
“Times of transition” is the story of what might happen if all of today’s good intentions were 
translated into the coherent and integrated development response necessary to tackle HIV and 
AIDS in Africa (through cumulative investments of nearly US$200 billion). In this scenario, there is a 
doubling of aid flows to Africa, sustained for a generation, with investments in health systems, 
agriculture, education, electrification, water, roads, social development, and institutional and 
governance capabilities. “Times of transition” describes fundamental changes in the ways donors 
provide aid and the ways governments deal with that aid, so that it promotes sovereignty, does 
not undermine autonomy, is not inflationary, and does not foster dependency. The important 
message of this scenario is that early expenditure, with a continuous growth in prevention 
spending, means that the care and treatment budget can begin to decline as early as 2019, as the 
total number of people living with HIV and AIDS begins to fall.  
Implications and learning from the three scenarios 
The worst of the epidemic’s impact is still to come, yet there is still a great deal that can be done to 
change the longer-term impacts. How the crisis confronting Africa is defined, and by whom, will 
make a fundamental difference to the outcome of tackling the crisis.The death toll will continue to 
rise, no matter what is done. Most commitments do not extend beyond the next five years, and 
uncertainty remains about the level of resources that will be available in the future. 
Source: UNAIDS (2005). Working Paper  7 
 
3  WHAT IS SCENARIO MAPPING? 
The history of scenario planning goes back to the early 1960s, with the work of Herman 
Kahn’s Hudson Institute in the United States and the “Futuribles” movement in France.  
Kahn wanted to find a way of “thinking the unthinkable” about the possibility of nuclear 
conflict between the superpowers. In the 1970s, Shell adopted the method in a business 
environment, using it to explore the consequences of a rapid increase in oil prices at a time 
when conventional wisdom thought this improbable. Oil prices did rise, and Shell’s strategic 
response transformed its market share and profitability, an outcome that increased 
awareness of scenarios in the business sector.  
As a discipline, scenarios work tends to be practitioner-led and is sometimes thought  
to be under-theorised. Different approaches have emerged from different disciplines and 
geographies. These include, for example, the dominant “double-uncertainty” matrix, 
 widely used in North America and the United Kingdom; the French “prospective” method; 
quantitative and qualitative cross-impact methods; and more interpretative methods such as 
causal layered analysis.  
Bishop, Hines and Collins (2007) suggest that there are about eight “families” of scenarios 
methods, and within these some 30 identifiable techniques. The morphological approach  
is a variant of the “uncertainty”-based approach to scenario development. Bishop Hines and 
Collins note that while morphological scenarios techniques “are more complicated and hence 
less common, they do overcome the difficulty that it is devilishly hard to capture the 
uncertainties of the future in just two dimensions.” 
Whichever method is used, they share a common underlying philosophical basis: 
that the future cannot be predicted; that there are multiple possible futures; and that  
by understanding, organisations can increase their resilience to change (List, 2005).  
As List (2005: 3) notes, “by the end of the 20th century, scenario work had become  
the most widely used method for multiplistic foresight.”  
Scenarios are a tool for thinking about the range of different possible futures, and  
can be used to inform policymaking. Using scenarios to explore and rehearse uncertainties 
may highlight a number of issues or potential options that require further detailed 
investigation or analysis.  
Scenarios are most commonly used as an analytical tool in a strategic context. 
Typically, they are used to broaden and deepen the way organisations sense their external 
environment, to connect this to the way they respond to stimuli, and to help define future 
vision and strategic priorities. They are often used to provide answers to what are termed 
“unstructured” or “wicked” problems—messy, adaptive problems that are not amenable to 
conventional approaches.
2 
Scenarios are typically used to rehearse different policy options available to an 
organisation, and to highlight their potential strengths, weaknesses and unintended 
consequences. Finally (and less frequently), they are used to “future proof”  
(or “windtunnel”) a decision or potential investment that is “on the table”.  8  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
Essentially, “future-proofing” the MDGs is about thinking how future(s) might impact 
the Goals, MDG gains, costs, strategies and opportunities for faster progress on the MDGs.  
The concept of future-proofing the MDGs is not new. It has been used with reference 
to “climate-proofing” the MDGs by Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub (2009: 5), who estimate 
that the cost of making the MDGs “climate-resilient” is about a third higher than the 
conventional cost of meeting the MDGs: about US$100 billion a year for the next decade, 
compared with US$72 billion a year for the MDGs alone. Extra costs arise from having to 
provide more development support (for example, extra bed nets against malaria), the 
same support at a higher cost (for example, more expensive infrastructure), and entirely 
new measures (for example, adaptive capacity building). Climate change can also lead to 
the prioritisation of certain measures compared to the baseline development plan  
(for example, disaster management).  
Scenarios should not be considered as predictions of the future (see Table 3). In reality, 
the future is likely to contain variations of elements found in each of the four narratives. 
Hence the narratives should be considered as a way of illustrating the range of potential 
future outcomes of combinations of drivers, rather than as definitive statements about 
future developments or variations around a midpoint or base case. 
TABLE 3 
What Are Scenarios? 
Scenarios should …   Scenarios should not …  
Effective scenarios should provide descriptions of alternative 
coherent and plausible futures, informed by structured and 
rigorous analysis of the most significant drivers of change. 
 
The narrative should present a logically coherent world, 
highlighting the drivers of change which combine to produce 
particular outcomes. 
 
The scenarios should be internally consistent. 
 
Crucially, effective scenarios should provide a specific, 
strategy-focused view of the future.  
 
Rather than describing a future world in general terms, they 
should provide specific and strategically relevant information 
on pertinent areas. 
Scenarios should not be considered as predictions of the 
future. In reality, the future is likely to contain variations of 
elements found in each of the four narratives.  
 
Importantly, scenarios should not present a generalised view 
of feared or desired outcomes. In any future world, there will 
be a range of “winners” and “losers”, and it is important that 
the scenario narratives reflect this. 
 
Finally, it is crucial that scenarios are not the product of 
outside futurists or consultants. In order for scenarios  
to gain traction within an organisation, it is important that 
people feel a sense of ownership of the narratives,  
and have a clear and robust understanding of the  
process undertaken to develop them.  
4  OUR METHODOLOGY 
4.1  GENERATING THE SCENARIOS 
Our scenarios were developed using a version of a method known as field anomaly relaxation 
(FAR), which is based on morphological analysis.  
This approach focuses on identifying and analysing the most significant drivers of change 
in the global financial and political system over the next 5–10 years. It allowed the project team 
to identify and develop four coherent and internally consistent scenarios and economic 
modelling based on analysis of those drivers 
This approach aims to create a backdrop of internally consistent futures for policy 
formation and decision making. Reflecting the breadth of the project question, it allowed  Working Paper  9 
 
a greater level of depth and veracity to be incorporated into the scenario narratives than  
the traditional “2x2” scenario approach, and enabled a closer link to the modelling work. 
Morphological analysis is a deductive process, in that the scenarios are “deduced” from an 
analysis of the drivers of change.
3  
A core assumption of the methodology is that we live in “fields” of interactions with other 
people and events. These fields can include structural factors such as political stability, social 
organisations or economic growth and exchange rates, as well as individual variables such as 
personal interactions and decisions. The fields are also interrelated: certain combinations 
of different fields present a coherent frame for understanding the future, while other 
combinations lack coherence (for example, a combination of high economic growth with  
high energy prices and high levels of political instability would be considered internally 
inconsistent). By examining different combinations of fields, the full morphological approach 
explores the range of imaginable and plausible patterns of interaction, eliminating those that 
do not satisfy an overall assessment of internal coherence. The remaining, internally consistent 
patterns are then used as stepping stones to create paths into the future. 
The project involved an initial scanning phase, during which the project team 
developed a long list of about 60+ key drivers of change, which were identified through a 
combination of desk research and interviews with development experts. See Sumner and 
Tiwari (2009) for the full list.  
“Drivers of change”, of course, is an approach familiar to many in development  
policy (Warrener, 2004). We define drivers of change here as forces (which can be social, 
technological, economic, environmental or political) that are likely to influence the outcome 
for the overall system or subject defined by the project question over the specified time 
period. They may influence it positively or negatively. In addition, a driver of change can  
be characterised by the way it impedes the rate of change—for example, “the low rate of 
investment in new technology”. The processes of scanning for drivers and then analysing them 
for importance and degrees of uncertainty are the platforms on which work in the scenarios 
field (and work in the futures field more generally) are based. Clusters of these drivers of 
change formed the “fields” or sectors of interaction central to the morphological approach.  
A number of techniques were used to refine this long list. Initially, workshops were held 
with stakeholders to reduce the initial 60 drivers to a shorter list of about 30 that (after review 
and testing) were considered to have greater impact on the shape of the global economy and 
development over the next decade. This assessment was largely qualitative. Relationships 
between these drivers were subsequently analysed by means of an impact matrix, based on 
the work of Godet (2001) to identify both “contextual drivers” (high-impact, and relatively 
independent of the other drivers) and those drivers that were important and also uncertain 
(high-impact and relatively interdependent).  
This analysis was cross-checked using Decision Explorer, a software tool that maps and 
analyses relationships within systems (Eden and Ackerman, 1998). Together, these three stages 
have been found to give sufficiently robust analysis of drivers and their inter-relationships in 
scenarios-development processes. The important and uncertain drivers were then grouped 
into factor themes, as outlined below, to describe the overall landscape. 10  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
The six core drivers chosen from the process above as priority drivers were: 
•  shifts in global wealth distribution;  
•  trends in multilateralism; 
•  changes in the intra-country polarisation of wealth/income inequality;  
•  changes in the nature of aid and development funding; 
•  rising energy prices (over the long term); and 
•  changes in information flows.  
 
A range of plausible outcomes or factors associated with these uncertainties over the 
period covered by the scenarios were then identified, and these uncertainties were put 
together in plausible combinations to create the outline scenario narratives. Table 4 shows  
the range of futures associated with each variable. 
TABLE 4 
Range of Futures Associated with Each Variable 
Sector Factor  Factor  Factor  Factor 
Shift in global wealth 
distribution  
Collapse of the US$  Rise in national 
protectionism 
Rapid shift in global 















present levels of 
inequality 
Political action 
taken to reduce 
inequality 
 
Nature of aid and 
development 
funding 
Reductions in aid 
expenditure as aid 
processes lack public 
accountability 
Vertical integration/ 
concentration of aid 
Continued 
fragmentation of aid 
 
Rising energy prices 
(over the long term)  
Slow / steady increase 
in energy price 
Sharp rise in energy 
prices 
Greater volatility in 
energy prices 




Continued growth in 
information flows 
Greater state control 
of information flows 
Decline/stagnation 




Each scenario included, at core, plausible combinations of the ranges of uncertainties 
outlined above (see Table 5). 
There are a number of benefits to using the deductive approach. It is a structured  
process, with a clear flow from drivers to scenarios construction. It also provides a relatively 
straightforward way to connect the scenarios to their strategic and policy implications. The factor 
combinations, initially identified through analysis by The Futures Company and IDS, were tested 
at stakeholder workshops as part of the scenario-development workshop. Working Paper  11 
 
TABLE 5 
Scenarios by Key Drivers 
Sector Roller  Coaster  Western 
(Re)Invention 
South by Southeast  The Odd Couple 
Shift in global wealth 
distribution  
Collapse of the US$  Global wealth shift 
slows 
Rapid shift in global 
wealth from West to 
East 







Polarisation of wealth/ 




present levels of 
inequality 
Political action taken to 
reduce inequality 
Stabilisation at 
present levels of 
inequality 
Nature of aid and 
development funding 
Reductions in aid 
expenditure as aid 
processes lack public 
accountability 
Asset transfer to 
poorer countries via 
carbon trading system 
Continued 
fragmentation of aid 
Vertical integration/ 
concentration of aid 
Rising energy prices 
(over the long term)  
Slow / steady increase 
in energy price 
Slow / steady 
increase in energy 
prices 
Greater volatility in 
energy prices 
Sharp rise in energy 
prices 
Information flows   Continued growth in 
information flows 





Greater state control 
of information flows 
4.2  THE MODELLING APPROACH AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Any categorisation of countries is contentious (see Harris, Moore and Schmidt [2009] for a recent 
review of “developing”-country classifications). Our model is based on a typology of developing 
countries according to their relationship with the global economy. The categories were chosen 
to reflect any given country’s relationship with the rest of the world through the balance of 
payments, and thus the link between the future scenarios or contexts and the country’s key 
macroeconomic variables by addressing these questions: Is the country a net fuel importer or 
exporter? Is the country dependent on non-fuel primary commodity exports and/or aid? 
These questions led us to develop country groupings based on combinations of net  
fuel-importing countries (Table 7) and fuel exporters, and dependency on non-fuel primary 
commodity exports and aid.
4 We deal with fuel exporters as one grouping (rather than 
combinations of fuel exporter with aid and non-fuel commodity exporters) because under  
all scenarios fuel prices are rising, implying that fuel revenues will accrue to those countries  
(the use and distribution of those fuel revenues is then a governance question). 
TABLE 6 
Combinations of Aid and Non-Fuel Commodity Dependent Countries 
     Is the country non-fuel commodity export dependent ?   
   Yes  No 
Is the country aid 
dependent? 
Yes    
No    
 
The specific quantification of thresholds for these variables are as in Table 7. Of course, 
these are not uncontentious.
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TABLE 7 
Definitions Used for Net Fuel Exporters, Non-Fuel Commodity Dependency,  
Foreign Aid Dependency 
Indicator  Our definition  Details and data 
Net fuel exporter  >20% of exports US$ value  Countries that have more than 20%  
of export value in fuels.  
There is an IMF WEO category of “fuel 
exporters” by the main source of export 
earnings.  
Data from UNCTAD. 
Net fuel importer  Positive net fuel trade  
 
Countries that import more fuels than 
they export. 
Data from UNCTAD. 
Non-fuel primary commodity 
dependency 
>50% of exports US$ value in three 
leading commodities 
Countries with more than half of all 
export earnings in three commodities. 
Data from UNCTAD. 
High foreign aid dependency  >9% of GNI  Countries with ODA/GDP greater  
than 9%. 
Data from World Bank WDI. 
Sources: OECD (2003), Harmonising Practices for Effective Aid Delivery. Paris. OECD; UNCTAD (2009), Trade and 
Development Report. Geneva, UNCTAD. 
 
We can then outline the characteristics of different countries. See the tables in the annex 
for countries and data, including additional information on private capital flows—foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and remittances—as it is relevant to the later discussion. We did not 
include portfolio flows because these are significant only in South Africa and Indonesia.  
We then have country groupings as follows.  
Net fuel exporters; for example, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and Indonesia. 
Net fuel importers:  
•  with neither primary commodity export dependency nor aid dependency: for 
example, Bangladesh and Nepal;  
•  with primary commodity dependency but without aid dependency: for example, 
Kenya and Jamaica;  
•  with both primary commodity export dependency and aid dependency: for 
example, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 
 
We take these country groupings and consider each future scenario. First, we ask  
what each scenario means at a global level for trends in: fuel prices (already explicit in each 
scenario); non-fuel primary commodity prices; the size and composition of aid flows; the size 
and composition of private capital flows (notably FDI and remittances). Key assumptions are in 
Tables 8, 9 and 10. 
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TABLE 8 
Key Variables and Underlying Assumptions as to Determinants 
Key variables linking scenario to countries  Key assumptions at to main determinants of trends 
Fuel prices  Explicit in each scenario. 
Non-fuel commodity prices  Prices are a function of prevailing trends in protectionism, which 
will raise prices; robust global growth, which will raise prices; and 
robust growth in the BRICs, which will raise prices. 
Aid flows  Size of flows are a function of a climate regulation agreement, 
which will increase flows; multilateralism, which will increase flows; 
and robust growth in the BRICs, which will increase flows (in non-
traditional aid). 
Private capital flows  Size of private flows are a function of prevailing trends in 
protectionism, which will reduce flows; global growth, which will 
increase flows; robust growth in the BRICs, which will increase 
BRIC outward private capital flows; and OECD growth, which will 
lead to increases in OECD outward capital flows.  
 
Finally, for each country grouping in each scenario we make assumptions for trends in 
medium-term economic growth prospects (based on trends in fuel prices, non-fuel commodity 
prices, aid flows and private capital flows), trends in labour demand (based on fuel prices, non-
fuel commodity prices, aid flows and private capital flows) and trends in public budgets (based 
on fuel prices, non-fuel commodity prices and aid flows) (see Table 9). 
TABLE 9 
Key Variables and Underlying Assumptions as to Determinants 
Key variables linking scenario to countries  Key assumptions at to main determinants of trends 
Medium-term economic growth prospects  Rising fuel prices dampen growth prospects for fuel importers and 
raise growth prospects for fuel exporters; rising commodity prices 
raise growth prospects in commodity dependent countries; rising 
aid raises growth prospects in aid dependent countries; and 
private capital flows raise growth prospects in all countries. 
Labour demand  Good growth prospects raise labour demand significantly if in  
non-fuel and non-commodities in particular. 
Public budget surplus/deficit  Good growth prospects lead to good public budget prospects. 
 
Of course, many of these assumptions may not hold in reality for all sorts of reasons, and 
many are determined by the quality of governance and social and economic policy (take, for 
example, whether oil revenues lead to healthy budgets).  
We then aggregate these trends to consider three key poverty indicators, taking three 
key MDGs: the dollar-a-day indicator, primary enrolment and child mortality. Although the 
timeline is 5–10 years, and thus to 2015 and beyond, we chose the MDGs to make the 
modelling concrete and also because household income poverty, child education and child 
mortality are likely to remain crucial dimensions of poverty reduction after 2015. Income 
poverty is linked to growth, labour demand and trends in food prices (assuming a significant 
link between food and fuel prices). Education and health poverty are linked to growth and 
public budgets (see Table 10). 
   14  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
TABLE 10 
Modelling Assumptions 
Outcome  Assumed key determinants 





Strength of  
global growth 
Strength of  
OECD country 
growth 






commodity prices    x x x x   
Volume of aid  x      x  x  x 
Volume of private 
capital    x x x x   
Level 2  Growth  Fuel  
prices 
Commodity  
prices  Aid  Private capital 
flows   
Strength  of  growth  n/a  x x x x   
Strength of labour 
demand  x   x  x  
State of public 
finances  x  x x x x   




Food prices  
(oil prices)    
Dollar-a-day 
poverty  x x    x     
Education MDGs  x    x       
Health MDGs  x    x  x     
 
 
We now outline each scenario in detail and MDG-related impacts for different types of 
countries. Box 2 introduces the four scenarios by identifying key drivers of each. 
 
BOX 2 
Future Scenarios Developed and Key Drivers 
 
South by Southeast: Key Drivers 
•  Minilateralism. 
•  Rapid shift in wealth from West to East. 
•  Sharp rise in energy prices. 
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continue to stagnate. Even after the “official” end of the recession, growth remains slow, and 
significant stimulus expenditure ultimately fails to revitalise industrial sectors in developed 
countries. The West appears to be slipping into a Japan-style “lost decade” of low interest  
rates and low levels of return.  
In contrast, many developing countries handle the fallout of the financial crisis with 
greater success. Cash-rich China increases its domestic investments, leveraging its significant 
foreign exchange reserves to buy foreign assets, provide direct financial assistance and make 
long-term deals with resource-rich countries (many in Africa) that lack liquidity. This move 
proves adroit given the sharp increase in the price of oil and energy prices, driven largely by 
increasing demand from emerging economies and also by the failure of energy technologies 
to deliver predicted efficiency gains. 
Moreover, the burgeoning middle classes in China, India and South America prove able to 
maintain domestic levels of demand, promoting continued rapid economic growth in these 
areas. Their growing influence is not just economic but also cultural. The Indian Premier 
League in cricket, Bollywood films, tai chi and Chinese food all challenge the hegemony  
of Hollywood, burgers and the English Premier League in football. 
5.1.2  Minilateralism 
Though there are calls for a “New Bretton Woods” to regulate the global economy better, 
policymakers fail to agree on a set of globally transparent and effective rules to apply to a 
world of differing capitalisms and levels of financial and institutional development.  
The result is that the idea of a single “international community” consisting of nation states 
is no longer a reality. Rather, a series of de facto trading blocs emerges. China has liberalised its 
economy by opening up to controlled forms of investment from “trusted partner states”  
such as Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea, and has signed a host of financial and trade 
agreements with much of the rest of Asia, Middle Eastern oil producers and Russia.  
These agreements, typically legitimated on the grounds of protecting these nations from 
“destabilising Western speculation”, emphasise many features of what commentators call the 
“Chinese model” of development, with tighter capital controls and greater state intervention 
across the economic cycle. 
Meanwhile, in developed markets, ongoing economic stagnation leads to a resurgence  
of nationalism and growing calls for economic protectionism: “Buy Local” campaigns (many 
endorsed by local politicians) grow in popularity in Europe and the United States. Politicians 
and pundits watch the relative economic decline of Europe and the US, the “hollowing out”  
of the industrial base and the growth of China’s economic sphere of influence with a growing 
sense of alarm. One response is much closer ties between the trading blocs of the European 
Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Low-income countries (LICs) lacking significant natural resources often find themselves 
left out of major trading blocs in this scenario. The African Union encourages the development 
of a regional trading bloc across the continent but this effort is only partially successful, 
because many resource-rich African countries tend to focus their diplomatic energies  
and calls for FDI on one or other of the regional trading blocs. 
Power is more dispersed in this scenario. Though the United States remains the single 
most powerful actor, its relative strength is in decline and US leverage is more constrained. Working Paper  17 
 
Without any significant central coordination, regulation tends to be led at a regional level and 
varies significantly between economic jurisdictions. Capital and goods flows between the 
blocs are impeded, and financial-service firms must often compete as regional entities with 
separate balance sheets. There is little coordination between the different trading blocs,  
and the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, IMF) are increasingly marginalised. 
5.1.3  A Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change 
Globally, there is no overarching “deal” to reduce carbon emissions significantly. Instead, the 
approach to emission reductions is piecemeal and measures are often taken at a regional level. 
There is little coordination in terms of emission cuts between the major trading blocs, and 
pledged reductions are typically non-binding. LICs are generally excluded from any 
requirement to reduce CO2 emissions until an emission threshold is reached. 
5.1.4  Restrictive Communications 
Communications and connectivity are more controlled and monitored by governments than 
they were in the first decade of this century, a trend that has been increasingly stealthy as data-
surveillance techniques have become more sophisticated. One result is further to reduce 
political activism and the influence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in both the 
South and the North. 
TABLE 11 
South by Southeast: Focus and Flow Questions 
What are the major 
patterns of production in 
this world? 
Production in this world is much more regional in nature. Global flows of goods are reduced both 
by the establishment of global trading blocs with limited flows of goods and capital between 
them, and by sharp increases in energy prices, which in turn increase the cost of shipping. 
What are the major 
patterns of consumption 
in this world?  
Overall consumption falls in this world: there is less international movement of goods,  
and thus what is consumed tends to be more regional in nature. 
How do people connect to 
one another in this world?  
 
Connections intensify within economic blocs in this world, but tend to decrease outside of it. 
English declines as the global lingua franca, particularly in countries closely tied to China, and 
hence websites are typically read in local languages. There is considerably more state 
monitoring of electronic communications: the Internet proves not to be the democratising force 
that many had hoped for in the 1990s. 
What are the institutional 
structures which support 
this world?  
The Bretton Woods institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, have significantly less 
influence in this scenario, and tend to be much more regional in nature. 
Which groups are 
marginalised in this 
world?  
 
Countries outside the major trading blocs are often marginalised in this world. While some LICs 
attract significant investment, typically in their resource sectors, many others exist outside the 
major trading blocs, with negative economic impacts. 
Western economic powers stagnate economically (and to a degree socially) in this world. 
Which groups are heard?  Energy producers, leading countries in regional trading blocs, regional governance bodies. 
Who gains from this 
world?  
Gainers in this world include resource-rich countries and developing countries that emerge 
relatively unscathed from the recession. 
Trends in non-oil 
commodity prices 
 
Overall direction of the trend: increasing. 
Non-fuel commodity prices rise because of significant demand from China and India,  
and greater protectionism may also increases prices. 
Trends in size and volume 
of aid flows 
 
Overall direction of the trend: declining. 
Aid flows are falling overall because of the declining influence of the West, but offset somewhat 
as aid flows shift composition to non-traditional donors. 
  → 
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Trends in size and form of 
private capital flows 
 
Overall direction of the trend: mixed 
Private capital flows are stagnating overall but there is a shift in composition as non-OECD 
capital flows increase at the same time as a decline/stagnation in OECD capital flows. Regional 
investment patterns become more pronounced—that is, Chinese FDI in ASEAN; South Africa in 
SADC; Russian in the Stan republics. Remittances from the European Union (EU) stagnate or 
fall but remittances from middle-income countries to LICs increase. Regional migration expands 
in “growth centres” such as Beijing and migration fluctuates with growth in those centres. 
5.2  IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY AND GROWTH 
In the South by Southeast scenario, fuel prices are rising steadily. Non-fuel commodity 
prices rise because of significant demand from China and India, while greater protectionism 
may also increase prices. Aid flows are falling overall because of the declining influence of the 
West, but this is offset somewhat as the composition of aid flows shifts to non-traditional 
donors. Private capital flows are stagnating overall but there is a shift in composition as 
non-OECD capital flows increase while OECD capital flows decline/stagnate. Regional 
investment patterns become more pronounced—Chinese FDI in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), South African in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), and Russian in the “Stan” republics. Remittances from the EU stagnate or fall, but 
remittances from middle-income countries to LICs increase. And regional migration expands in 
“growth centres” such as Beijing, fluctuating with growth in those centres. 
TABLE 12 
South by Southeast: Variables and Trends 
Variable Direction  of  variable  Trend  details 
Fuel prices   Ï  Rising steadily. 
Non-fuel commodity prices  Ï  Higher prices because of robust BRIC 
growth. 
Size of aid flows  Ð  Falling because of declining influence of 
West. Shift to non-traditional donors. 
Size of private capital flows 
Ð 
Overall, stagnating. Fall in OECD private 
capital flows offset somewhat by rise in 
non-OECD private capital flows. 
 
 
What does the South by Southeast scenario mean for different types of countries?  
Table 14 provides an overview. 
•  For fuel exporters this is again a potentially positive scenario as rising fuel prices 
spur growth and public spending. Labour demand might benefit in a limited way 
from fuel-led growth and/or from robust demand from the BRIC countries, but be 
constrained by a lack of private capital. As a result, income poverty, education and 
health indicators have the potential to improve steadily. 
•  For fuel importers, things are more mixed. For fuel importers with neither primary 
commodity export dependency nor aid dependency, the outlook is potentially 
positive because robust growth in the BRIC countries fuels growth and labour 
demand. Again, as a result, income poverty, education and health indicators have 
the potential to improve steadily. Working Paper  19 
 
•  For fuel importers with commodity dependence but without aid dependency, this is a 
potentially positive scenario because higher non-fuel commodity prices would 
support growth and healthier public budgets, and thus underpin income poverty 
reduction and improved education and health indicators. 
•  For fuel importers with commodity dependence and aid dependency, this scenario is 
potentially more negative. Although rising commodity prices would support 
growth and public spending, the impact of drastically declining aid budgets could 
have greatly influenced income poverty, education and health. 
TABLE 13 
South by Southeast: Medium-Term Prospects for Each Country Grouping 
Code: GREEN = positive prospects; ORANGE = mixed prospects; RED = negative prospects. 
6  SCENARIO 2: WESTERN (RE)INVENTION 
6.1  OUTLINE NARRATIVE 
6.1.1  US and EU Reinvention 
Policies introduced to prevent the worst excesses of the recession prove successful in 
developed markets and many return to robust levels of economic growth by 2013, their 
economies proving resilient, flexible and adaptive. Financial institutions taken into public 
ownership during the depth of the financial crisis are quickly returned to the private sector 
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Strong economic growth   GREEN GREEN GREEN ORANGE 
Strong labour demand   ORANGE GREEN  GREEN  ORANGE/RED 
Healthy public budgets  GREEN GREEN GREEN  ORANGE/RED 
Poverty reduction prospects 
Reduction in the dollar-a-day poverty 
headcount ratio 
GREEN GREEN GREEN ORANGE 
Improvement in primary school 
enrolment/completion ratios 
GREEN GREEN GREEN  ORANGE/RED 
Improvement in child and infant 
mortality rates 
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broadly intact. The US dollar and the euro have fallen against a basket of international currencies, 
increasing the competitiveness of exports, and US bond yields remain low and stable. Equity, oil 
and commodity prices have risen, creating challenges for exporters such as China, while stock, 
bond and currency prices in emerging markets have increased by even greater proportions.  
The push for renewable energy in the EU and the United States slowly lowers their demand 
for fossil fuels, reducing trade surpluses with Russia and with Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, 
the greater focus on developing a more sustainable national infrastructure provides a further 
economic stimulus in developed economies, shifting from the consumption-led growth of the 
1990s to investment-led growth. 
The EU, meanwhile, reasserts the Lisbon goal of becoming a dynamic and competitive 
knowledge-based economy by 2020. The United States, emboldened by the success of its 
stimulus spending and re-assertive financial sector, appears ready to continue its leading  
role in developing and managing global financial architecture. 
6.1.2  Challenges in Developing Countries 
One significant outcome is that, while emerging economies continue to grow, the differences in 
the levels of growth are smaller than in previous decades. Infrastructure bottlenecks, resource 
shortages (including water shortages), as well as limits on the productive capacity of the land 
and an increase in the rate of desertification, all prove a drag on the pace of development, as 
does a global carbon trading system that penalises energy-inefficient production. The steady 
increase in the price of oil finally reduces the comparative advantage of export-oriented 
economies as the cost of shipping goods increases with the cost of oil, and there is a parallel 
decline in levels of FDI in emerging markets. 
In China, there is social unrest following the succession of the fifth-generation Chinese 
leaders in 2012. While the immediate causes are clear (a slowing economy and alarm over 
the effects of environmental damage), the protesters are increasingly middle class, 
concerned to hold Chinese officials and politicians to account for how they spend tax 
revenues and for their political choices. 
6.1.3  A New Variant of Multilateralism 
The speed of contagion of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis concentrates the minds of 
many policymakers with regard to the interconnected nature of many global challenges.  
One of the most significant impacts of this is a reassessment of many assumptions about 
multilateralism. While the view among many experts had been that a multipolar world would 
lead to more representative international institutions, in reality the G20 proves too complex a 
structure for significant breakthroughs, as amply illustrated by the grindingly slow progress of 
the Copenhagen talks. Instead, many policymakers (and particularly those from the developed 
world) argue that, given the scale of the global financial and environmental challenges, 
effectiveness and efficiency are more important than pure representativeness, and 
negotiations tend to involve “The Quartet” of the EU, the United States, Japan and China. 
One of the most significant impacts of this new multilateralism is a global agreement  
on a common framework for regulating carbon emissions, including some asset transfer from 
wealthy to poor countries by means of a carbon-credits system. Centred in London and New 
York, the trading system effectively provides a subsidy to LICs with small carbon emissions. Working Paper  21 
 
6.1.4  Green Technologies 
Both the EU and the United States pour significant funds into the development of green 
technologies, with generous subsidies for research and innovation, while the steadily 
increasing oil price pushes the drive for energy independence up the agenda. 
Green technologies lead many commentators to refer to the new world order as “the 
hourglass world”: LICs at the bottom benefit from asset transfer through carbon credits and 
the growth of new “green” manufacturing and energy generation, while developed countries 
at the top maintain their global share of GDP and their significant influence over global 
institutions. It is the developing and middle-income countries that are squeezed. 
6.1.5  Storing up Future Problems? 
Fundamental reform of the banking system remain elusive, leading some commentators to 
warn of the dangers of a second and more damaging financial crisis in the years to come. 
Concentration in banking is even greater than before the crisis, and attempts at a more 
coordinated response to risk prove unsuccessful. 
Moreover, a new generation of leaders in middle-income countries increasingly  
came to question the failure to undertake fundamental reform of the global financial 
architecture, as well as their continuing relative lack of influence over major decisions.  
Brazilian Premier Heloísa Helena, an outspoken critic of the new arrangements, comments  
that the new system represents “the new face of colonialism”. 
In LICs, such concerns are heard less often. Carbon trading has been a boon and there  
has been significant asset transfer through carbon credits, contributing to higher levels of 
economic growth and improved living conditions for many—though the poor do not always 
benefit from these transfers. Many LICs have high hopes for development strategies that 
involve “clean” manufacture and energy generation, “leapfrogging” countries with older and 
less efficient industrial bases. Finally, one of the most striking developments has been reverse 
technology transfer, from South to North, of more versatile and low-impact technologies—
from passive building design to water treatment. 
TABLE 14 
Western Reinvention: Focus and Flow Questions 
What are the major 
patterns of production in 
this world? 
 
Patterns of manufacturing are shifting in this world. While the story for much of the 1990s and 
2000s had been about the huge growth of manufacturing in China, the combination of a higher 
oil price and carbon trading reduces the comparative advantage of countries reliant on exports 
of low-value goods. Instead, some production is moved back to developed economies, while 
LICs are able to profit from the higher market in carbon through “leapfrog” development.  
What are the major 
patterns of consumption 
in this world?  
 
One of the major trends in consumption in this world is the increasing move towards more locally 
produced goods. The cost of transportation, driven both by a rising oil price and the cost of 
carbon, means that there is less comparative advantage in producing goods on one side of the 
world and transporting them to the other, and more production is based closer to consumers. 
This development provides a relative boost for economies (particularly Western economies) with 
large numbers of wealthy consumers, though the net effect is an absolute loss of welfare. 
How do people connect to 
one another in this world?  
 
The global ICT boom continues, albeit with a greater focus on the energy efficiency of servers 
and less waste in materials. The continuing spread of mobile technology in Africa has 
transformed information systems (and financial systems), and has improved the visibility of the 
poor areas in the North. 
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What are the institutional 
structures which support 
this world?  
 
Institutional structures in this world are remarkably unchanged. The World Bank and IMF retain 
significant Western influence, while less influence is assigned to middle-income countries. 
Institutions that were able to act as conduits of carbon trading, especially the IMF, gain 
particularly in influence, while the development of an International Carbon Trading Exchange in 
London is also important.  
Which groups are 
marginalised in this 
world?  
 
Middle-income and developing countries are particularly marginalised in this world, as Western 
nations continue to dominate most global institutions. In the longer term, this marginalisation 
leads to significant resentment among rulers and populations, and thus the institutional 
structures in this scenario may not be stable in the longer term. 
Which groups are heard? 
 
Many “traditional” voices continue to be heard in this scenario: the World Bank, IMF and WTO all 
retain influence. Outcomes for LICs are also relatively positive, as they benefit from the asset 
transfer afforded by the global carbon trading system and from investment in new “green” 
technologies. 
Who gains from this 
world?  
 
LICs are one group that gains in this world. Asset transfer via carbon credits, plus significant 
investment in green technologies, provide a boost to economic growth, while the cost of carbon 
emissions reduces the comparative advantage of other primary manufacturers (such as China). 
Developed nations also gain, as they manage to maintain their share of GDP and their 
dominance of many international institutions. 
Trends in non-oil 
commodity prices 
 
Overall direction of the trend: increasing. 
The return of strong economic growth in the West (about 3–4%) drives an increase in non-oil 
commodity prices. 
One result of this is greater FDI into LICs with natural resources. 
Trends in size and volume 
of aid flows 
 
Overall direction of the trend: declining. 
Traditional aid flows, especially from Western powers, decline (albeit relatively slowly) as asset 
transfer through carbon trading comes to be viewed as an appropriate substitute. 
Note: a strong feature of this scenario is that trade and aid flows are increasingly difficult to 
disaggregate. While traditional flows are in decline, there is a combination of resource transfer to 
poorer countries via carbon trading and continued FDI (driven primarily by high-priced 
commodities). 
Trends in size and form of 
private capital flows 
 
Overall direction of the trend: increasing. 
Private capital flows to LICs grow in this world, as a result of high commodity prices and of asset 
transfer via carbon trading. 
In addition, some LICs are able to capitalise on the demand for low-carbon technologies,  
and to “leapfrog” countries with legacy dirty infrastructure (such as through significant 
investment in solar). 
 
6.2  IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY AND GROWTH 
Western Reinvention is a scenario in which trade and aid flows are increasingly difficult to 
disaggregate. While traditional flows are in decline, there is a combination of resource-transfer 
to poorer countries through carbon trading and continued FDI (driven mainly by high-priced 
commodities). Carbon credits tend to displace other flows of aid. As a result, there is an 
increase in influence for organisations that become involved in brokering those flows or 
buying/selling credits (such as a new “International Centre for Carbon Trading”, the EU, the 
African Union), and a decline in influence for organisations that are less involved (such as the 
IMF and bilateral donors).  
In this scenario, fuel prices are rising steadily. Non-fuel commodity prices rise, driven 
by the return of strong economic growth in the West (about 3–4 per cent). Aid flows rise 
dramatically and their composition changes. Traditional aid flows are dwarfed as 
carbon/climate aid and trading come to be viewed as appropriate substitutes. And private 
capital flows increase as a result of high commodity prices and of asset transfer through 
carbon trading. In addition, some LICs are able to capitalise on the demand for low-carbon Working Paper  23 
 
technologies and to “leapfrog” countries with legacy dirty infrastructure (for example,  
by means of significant investment in solar energy). One result of this is greater FDI into  
LICs with natural resources. 
TABLE 15 
Western Reinvention: Variables and Trends 
Variable Direction  of  variable  Trend  details 
Fuel prices  Ï  Rising steadily 
Non-fuel commodity prices  Ï  Higher prices because of robust 
global growth 
Size of aid flows 
Ï 
Rising significantly because of 
western recovery and climate change 
asset transfers 
Size of private capital flows  Ï  Rising because of western recovery 
 
What does the Western Reinvention scenario mean for different types of countries?  
Table 16 provides a colour-coded quick reference. The table is a sea of green. This scenario is 
reminiscent of the period between the late 1990s and the 2008 global crisis. The only cloud on 
the horizon is the speed of fuel price rises. 
For fuel exporters this is a potentially positive scenario because steadily rising fuel prices 
support growth and fund healthy public budgets. Labour demand is buoyant because of 
global growth and private capital flows. Hence income poverty, education and health 
indicators are all likely to improve. 
For fuel importers things are generally positive, with a caveat related to the speed  
of fuel price rises. 
For fuel importers with neither primary commodity export dependency nor aid dependency, 
this is largely a potentially positive scenario because growth is led by global recovery and 
private capital flows. Public budgets are healthy as a result, and thus income poverty, 
education and health all improve. 
For fuel importers with commodity dependence but without aid dependency, this is also 
largely a potentially positive scenario because non-fuel commodity prices are rising, thereby 
supporting growth. Labour demand is buoyant because of global growth. Hence public 
budgets are healthy and income poverty, education and health all improve gradually. 
For fuel importers with commodity dependence and aid dependency, again this is largely a 
potentially benign scenario, with the same caveat on fuel-price trends. 
This group of countries benefit hugely from climate aid and trade, as well as from rising 
non-fuel commodity prices. Consequently growth is strong, as is labour demand, and public 
budgets are healthy. As a result there is real progress on income poverty, education and 
health indicators. 
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TABLE 16 



























































Strong economic growth  GREEN GREEN GREEN  GREEN 
Strong labour demand  GREEN GREEN GREEN  GREEN 
Healthy public budgets  GREEN GREEN GREEN  GREEN 
Poverty reduction prospects 
Reduction in the dollar-a-day poverty 
headcount ratio 
GREEN GREEN GREEN  GREEN 
Improvement in primary school 
enrolment/completion ratios 
GREEN GREEN GREEN  GREEN 
Improvement in child and infant 
mortality rates 
GREEN GREEN GREEN  GREEN 
Code: GREEN = positive prospects; ORANGE = mixed prospects; RED = negative prospects. 
7  SCENARIO 3: THE ODD COUPLE 
7.1  OUTLINE NARRATIVE 
7.1.1  The Rise of “Chimerica”  
In this scenario the fragile economic relationship between the United States and China, in 
which China’s trade and capital surpluses support America’s continuing debts, remains the 
house of cards on which the global economy is built. But the United States is vulnerable in the 
wake of the global financial crisis, and thus China takes the opportunity to turn its economic 
leverage into greater political and diplomatic influence.  
Chinese corporations and diplomats are much more active on the world stage, not least in 
a continuing search to satisfy China’s increasing energy and food needs. These moves are not 
uncontroversial, especially because resource deals are often reached with autocratic or violent 
states. But international (and American) reaction to these moves is more muted than it has 
been in the past: US politicians realise the extent to which China has continued to underpin 
the dollar, while Chinese policymakers recognise the importance of maintaining the dollar’s 
value and hence their reserves. Working Paper  25 
 
The big gain for China is its increasing power and influence over international 
organisations, gained with American support. The 2016 agreement on a new constitution  
for the IMF, which provides emerging economies with significantly more power to influence 
the direction of the Fund (along with the non-too-subtle symbolism of building a new 
headquarters in Hong Kong), is simply the most visible of a growing number of reforms to the 
international system geared to rebalancing representativeness towards emerging economies. 
At the same time, Chinese investment in US corporations continues to grow; the acquisition  
of one of the big three US carmakers in 2015 is seen as a decisive moment.  
The reaction to these shifts in developed economies is muted. Staggering under the 
weight of significant banking losses and refusing to accept that their aggressive reflationary 
policies and focus on industry-led manufacturing could once again prove counterproductive, 
their recovery from the recession is slower than many had hoped. Many find it difficult to argue 
that they continue to deserve additional voting rights. By the end of the decade, even the most 
hubristic and nationalist of American commentators has to admit that America’s period as the 
sole superpower seems to be over, the country’s freedom of movement being increasingly 
restrained by the closeness of its ties with China.  
Closeness with China, however, increases the distance between the United States and 
Europe, with ever widening trans-Atlantic splits on a broad range of issues including trade 
policy, intellectual property rights, defence and human rights.  
Driven by steadily rising energy costs and slower demand, the level of global trade flows 
fails to reach the heights of 2005/6, consistently remaining at about 15–20 per cent below  
their peak. Under pressure from domestic voters, many politicians in developed countries are 
tempted to re-introduce old trade barriers, often under the rubric of environmental legislation. 
7.1.2  A Framework for Tackling Emissions 
In 2010 an agreement is reached on a common regulatory framework for significantly cutting 
carbon emissions by 2050, the result of huge diplomatic efforts by players from a wide range  
of countries. Though the deal is seen as a triumph by those who were party to the tough 
negotiations preceding it, campaigners and activists are quick to point out a number of 
weaknesses. Foremost among these is that neither the United States nor China fully subscribe 
to the common agreement on emissions reductions. Rather, both choose to implement carbon 
cuts outside of the internationally agreed framework. 
One unexpected outcome of this agreement’s partial nature is that NGOs, especially in 
Europe and Latin America, are energised by the extent of the agreement reached in the 
months after Copenhagen, and by the fact that the United States and China go their own  
way. American and Chinese corporations find themselves boycotted elsewhere in the world 
because of their sustainability policies or their poor labour conditions.  
For LICs, the picture is mixed. The relative recovery of global prosperity means that levels 
of international donations to LICs recover. China’s increasing role in the IMF leads to a new-
found pragmatism about approaches to structural change in countries that find themselves  
in difficulties, while the World Trade Organisation (WTO) tends to concentrate on the more 
blatant cases of trade dumping. The World Bank finds itself caught between competing 
models of development, and is all but paralysed as a result. At the same time, because of the 26  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
extent of the agreement on climate change, NGOs are effective in aligning funds from 
European governments and private foundations with sustainability projects that have good 
outcomes for development. 
7.1.3  Storing up Future Trouble 
By 2020, many commentators are predicting future instability. The US-China partnership has 
held for a decade, but questions are increasingly being asked about the extent to which 
Chinese creditors are willing (or indeed able) to continue to buy American debt and, in effect, 
support the dollar. In China, many say that the country’s prominence in important global 
organisations has been earned by its economic performance, and some argue that China 
needs more concessions from the United States in return for continuing to underwrite the US 
economy. More assertive members of the Politburo are reported to be saying—in a coded way, 
of course—that there is only a limited future in being America’s bagman, or (depending on the 
translator) its butler.  
TABLE 17 
The Odd Couple: Focus and Flow Questions 
What are the major 
patterns of production in 
this world? 
More green technologies produced. More trade within regions than across regions. 
What are the major 
patterns of consumption 
in this world?  
More efficient consumption of all goods and services, with penalties for breaching stipulated 
standards. 
How do people connect to 
one another in this world?  
Using online conferencing facilities mainly, which are a standard feature of any large or small 
organisation. 
What are the institutional 
structures which support 
this world?  
National governments, regional specialist trade and economic committees, US congressional 
political system, continuing presence of the International Monetary Fund and climate change 
management institutions put in place after Copenhagen. 
Which groups are 
marginalised in this 
world?  
World Bank. 
Which groups are heard?  China, United States, NGOs.  
Who gains from this 
world?  
Regional governance institutions, national governments/states, regional and national NGOs. 
Trends in non-oil 
commodity prices 
Overall direction of the trend: declining. 
Food, other non-oil commodities fall in price because of reduced volumes of trade. 
Trends in size and volume 
of aid flows 
Overall direction of the trend: decline of traditional aid. 
Aid is tied to trade deals, foreign policy, and technological assistance to go green. Volume of aid 
is down for LICs without natural resources or carbon quotas to sell. 
Trends in size and form of 
private capital flows 
Overall direction of the trend: declining. 
With overall trade volumes down, capital flows will also be lower. But greater regionalism also 
boosts regional investment, which maintains the level of private capital flows within regions.  
7.2  IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY AND GROWTH 
In the “Odd Couple” scenario, fuel prices rise steadily and non-fuel commodity prices 
stagnate because of the stagnation of growth and trade volume, as well as sluggish recovery 
(commodity price declines perhaps being slowed by protectionism). Aid flows fall and their 
composition changes because of a lack of multilateralism. Traditional aid in particular 
declines, but non-traditional aid increases. There are changes in the way aid is measured  Working Paper  27 
 
and defined: it is more typically tied to trade and investment. But if climate-change aid is a 
result of a climate agreement, this could dwarf other flows and thus reverse the overall trend 
on aid. Private capital flows are static/declining and their composition is changing  
(as a result of protectionism). If trade volumes fall, capital flows will probably fall too,  
though not necessarily. Increased regional investment could be more significant. 
TABLE 18 
Odd Couple: Variables and Trends 
Variable Direction  of  variable  Trend  details 
Fuel prices   Ï  Steadily rising. 
Non-fuel commodity prices 
Ð 
Stagnation because of growth and 
trade volume stagnation, as well as 
sluggish recovery (with commodity 
price declines perhaps slowed by 
protectionism). 
Size of aid flows  Ð  Declining because of lack of 
multilateralism. 
Size of private capital flows  Ð  Falling as a result of protectionism. 
 
What does the “Odd Couple” scenario mean for different types of countries?  
Table 19 summarises the implications of the scenario for the different country-groupings 
across macroeconomic and poverty-reduction indicators, using the colour coding  
explained above. 
For fuel exporters such as Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Indonesia, Vietnam and Yemen,  
this is a world of good prospects: good growth prospects because of fuel-price rises; labour-
demand prospects are weak because growth is fuel-led with stagnating commodity prices,  
aid, and private capital inflows. Assuming the fuel revenue is used productively, public budgets 
should be healthy (one might question that food prices may rise because of fuel-price rises, 
which will have an impact on poverty through households that are net food consumers:  
the urban poor and the rural poor who have little or no land). These impacts may be mitigated 
by creating fiscal space for public expenditures, which could also maintain education and 
health budgets and secure some progress on the education and health MDGs. The key  
policy issue is whether the fuel revenues are channelled into social spending.  
For fuel importers, things are more mixed. 
For fuel importers with neither primary commodity export dependency nor aid dependency, 
such as Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and China, this scenario is potentially not too bad 
because, although the fuel-price rise slows growth, there may be better prospects for non-
commodity exports (manufactures and services) from these countries, as well as other sources 
of finance. Thus growth, labour demand and public budgets may not be impacted as much as 
in other groupings. Because of this, moreover, income, education and health poverty may not 
come under such significant pressure. This, however, depends on the impact of food-price rises 
on consumption poverty and health. 
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TABLE 19 
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Sudan, Indonesia, 

















Strong economic growth   GREEN  ORANGE  RED RED 
Strong labour demand   GREEN/ORANGE ORANGE  RED RED 
Healthy public budgets  GREEN/ORANGE ORANGE  RED RED 
Poverty reduction prospects 
Reduction in the dollar-a-day 
poverty headcount ratio 
GREEN/ORANGE ORANGE  RED RED 
Improvement in primary school 
enrolment/completion ratios 
GREEN/ORANGE ORANGE  RED RED 
Improvement in child and infant 
mortality rates 
GREEN/ORANGE ORANGE  RED RED 
Code: GREEN = positive prospects; ORANGE = mixed prospects; RED = negative prospects. 
 
For fuel importers with commodity dependence and without aid dependency, such as Kenya 
and Jamaica, there is potentially a “double whammy” in fuel and commodity prices, and thus 
growth, labour demand and public budgets are all likely to stagnate while food prices rise. 
These countries may become aid-dependent as a result. Income poverty is hit by lower growth, 
and education and health are under pressure because of the loss of fiscal space. 
Finally, for fuel importers with commodity dependence and aid dependency, such as Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Afghanistan 
and Guyana, there is potentially a “triple whammy” of fuel prices rising, commodity prices 
stagnating, and declining aid. Income poverty may be severely impacted by lower growth, and 
education and health may come under pressure because of the loss of fiscal space. 
8  SCENARIO IV: ROLLER COASTER 
8.1  OUTLINE NARRATIVE 
8.1.1  A Financially Unstable World 
In the  Roller Coaster scenario, the world moves away from the dollar as a reserve currency. 
After a period of financial instability, the euro replaces the dollar and the economic  
and political stability that this creates rumbles on, becoming the overwhelming feature  
of the scenario.  Working Paper  29 
 
The headlines for LICs are poor: none of the actors is looking out for the interests of LICs, 
and the overall level of aid declines. With the decline of multilateral organisations and of 
regional groups, there are no political processes into which countries can be “co-opted” to 
support a development agenda.  
The catalyst is a rise in the level of hostility towards the United States among younger 
Muslims in the Gulf. Faced with greater militancy (and sympathy), Yemen decides to start 
migrating oil contracts to euro-pricing as the opportunity arises. Iran begins to follow suit.  
The US sabre-rattling that follows makes the decision far more visible than it would otherwise 
have been. Attempts by governments to shore up the dollar’s decline are washed away by the 
wall of speculative money that bets against the dollar, and the currency plummets. Suddenly 
the United States, long used to the domestic financial benefits of being the world’s reserve 
currency, is living on empty. 
Shifts in reserve currencies are turbulent affairs. They are protracted and disruptive.  
One early price of instability is a quick contraction of the influence of multilateral institutions, 
as countries turn to traditional allies and trading partners to help them through the crisis. 
Bilateral and other local regional arrangements rapidly replace larger-scale regional and 
multilateral arrangements in the face of economic contraction. 
8.1.2  Decline in the Dollar, Rise in the Euro 
The most immediate casualty is the United States, which suffers heavy exchange-rate decline 
despite the best efforts of economic allies, especially in Asia, to support it. Many countries  
that were surprised by the switch from the dollar still have substantial dollar holdings and  
have a strategic interest in ensuring that the currency stabilises. American exports are more 
competitive than ever as a result of the currency decline. And in a world where large countries 
are now net food importers, America’s grainbelt is a strategic asset. Nonetheless, the shock to 
the United States is psychological as well as economic; its politics turns in on itself.  
Despite longstanding calls for a new reserve currency based on a basket of global 
currencies, the speed of the transition leaves no opportunity for this. The euro is the only 
currency with a large enough economic base to take the weight. One of the advantages of the 
euro’s new-found seigniorage is that it can reflate the struggling EU economies. Frankfurt, as a 
result, has become an increasingly important financial services centre and has been bolstered 
by the decision to move the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development to the city, 
and into the Eurozone, from London. It is surely only a matter of time before the United 
Kingdom decides it should join.  
One medium-term non-economic consequence is the US withdrawal, for budget reasons, 
from many of its former military bases, and a general reduction in the capability of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In a world of increasing tensions, skirmishes tend to flare 
up more quickly and persist for longer. There is recurrent border fighting in the Himalayas 
between India and China, partly caused by disputes over the mountains’ increasingly 
important water resources. 
8.1.3  International Institutions Lose Influence 
International institutions traditionally regarded as sympathetic to the United States have 
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afterwards. The WTO and associated bodies have found their judgements on trade disputes 
ignored and unenforceable. The IMF gained some credibility by issuing special drawing  
rights to ease the global economy during the transition from the dollar, but is regarded with 
suspicion. Russia, for example, now a global creditor because of the size of its energy reserves, 
has not forgiven the Fund for the disastrous policy conditions it attached to the loans of  
the 1990s, while the Middle Eastern states have long been suspicious of its close links to 
Washington’s policymakers. Its proposed move in 2022 (Singapore and Abu Dhabi are 
candidates) is seen by some as a last throw of the dice to make the institution more credible.  
In the Arab world, the question of how an Islamic Monetary Fund might be designed is active.  
Good international relationships are not helped by the unreliability of electronic 
communications. In a volatile economic world, volumes of spam and electronic fraud and  
theft have soared, to the point that it is unsafe to use the Internet without encryption.  
Simpler applications for this are emerging, but the days of sending a quick email or logging on, 
unsecured, to a social networking site seem distant. One of the Asian “Stan” republics, widely 
regarded as a centre for electronic crime, finds its electronic links to the rest of the world 
severed, probably by the Russians, in a move that is simultaneously decried and applauded.   
In a world where the significant economic players have a strong interest in oil production, 
environmental issues are less prominent and harder to articulate, since global institutions are 
fragmented and ever more lacking in influence. The main factor behind the reduction of 
carbon emissions is simply the lower levels of economic activity.  
At the same time, however, the instability of oil prices in uneven markets has its own cost, 
since it makes it difficult for businesses and national finance departments to plan. Renewables 
start to acquire a “security premium” against oil, which increases investment in their 
development. As economic instability continues, governments find themselves squeezed 
between their poor financial position and increasingly vociferous populist domestic pressure 
to take action to improve economic performance. Some have already ignored the advice of 
their economists and have simply started to print money. Where there is spare capacity, the 
inflationary risks are not great. And even if there is inflation, the winners outnumber the losers. 
For the LICs, aid flows generally decline, although there are some increases in aid tied to 
political and diplomatic objectives. Outcomes for LICs without natural resources are poor. 
TABLE 20 
Roller Coaster: Focus and Flow Questions 
What are the major 
patterns of production in 
this world? 
Production becomes more local (and there is less of it) as the global economy becomes more 
fragmented and energy prices become more volatile. 
What are the major 
patterns of consumption 
in this world?  
Consumption falls in general. There is less international trade, so consumption tends to be of 
more regional goods, or of goods produced by traditional trading partners (e.g., Britain buys 
bananas from the “old Empire”). 
How do people connect to 
one another in this world?  
 
Use of electronic connections declines because of increasing crime and identify theft in the 
electronic sphere. Providers that can offer secure connections and gateways prosper (e.g., 
mobile operators) but the cost of such provision is higher than internet-based systems, so 
communications become more expensive as a share of income—also leading to reductions.  
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What are the institutional 
structures which support 
this world?  
Institutions generally are in retreat. There are few credible global organisations. Instead, this 
world seems like a return to a form of mercantilism in which governments promote their own 
commercial interests, backed with judicious application of military power as necessary.  
The EU benefits because the euro has become the reserve currency and because it manages  
to maintain its large internal market.  
Which groups are 
marginalised in this 
world?  
The United States; environmental activists; internationalists.  
Which groups are heard?  Energy producers; Muslims; the EU.  
Who gains in this world?  
 
Gainers include: the Eurozone countries; economic elites in resource-rich countries. Islamic 
social movements become more influential; pirates (and mercenaries) become more widespread.  
Trends in non-oil 
commodity prices 
 
Overall direction of the trend: declining. 
This is a scenario of decline and instability, with obvious consequences for economic 
performance and trading relationships (both contract). Hence the impact on industrial 
commodities will be that prices fall (declining demand); the impact on commodities that 
represent stores of value (gold, diamonds) are likely to rise, especially gold; instability over 
the reserve currency likely to migrate towards the euro no matter how well organised Europe’s 
bankers are. Lower trade will probably exacerbate food shortages where they have started 
(food reserves are likely to represent political and diplomatic leverage) and hence prices  
will probably be higher.  
Trends in size and volume 
of aid flows 
 
Overall direction of the trend: declining. 
Increasing bilateralism, probable recession and increased global mistrust are likely to mean that 
multilateral aid flows fall. There may be an increase in bilateral flows, especially where these are 
linked to diplomatic, strategic or political objectives. It is also likely that there will still be multi-
millionaires in this world, although they may be more anxious than at present. Hence we expect 
aid flows from private foundations, but these will also fall.  
There may be an increase in regional aid (e.g., resource winners helping neighbours). 
Trends in size and form of 
private capital flows 
 
Overall direction of the trend: mixed. 
This is complex, but it seems unlikely there will be an early rebalancing of global capital 
reserves, and energy exporters will be the big winners. Hence their reserves will be looking 
for a home, almost certainly in Europe (the only location apart from the United States with 
the scale and robustness).China’s investments will depend on how well it has played  
the dollar decline and the extent to which it uses resources to improve internal 
infrastructure and demand. The euro question: will it use new-found reserve  
status to spend without responsibility?  
8.2  IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY AND GROWTH 
The “ Roller Coaster” is a scenario of decline and instability, with clear consequences for 
economic performance and trading relationships. Fuel prices are volatile and rising. Non-fuel 
commodity prices are falling because of declining demand and recession. However, the 
impact on commodities, which represent stores of value (gold, diamonds) usually rise in these 
periods. Prices for food and water increase as less trade exacerbates food shortages. Aid flows 
decline because of recession, and global mistrust increases. There may be an increase in some 
bilateral flows, especially where they are linked to diplomatic, strategic or political objectives. 
Aid flows from foundations also fall. Regional aid may become more important. Private 
capital flows decline overall, particularly from OECD countries, because of recession, which 
might be partially offset by non-OECD flows as China’s investments take advantage of non-fuel 
commodity price trends.  
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TABLE 21 
Roller Coaster: Variables and Trends 
Variable Direction  of  variable  Trend  details 
Fuel prices   Ï  Volatile and rising significantly. 
Non-fuel commodity prices  Ð  Lower prices because of global 
recession. 
Size of aid flows  Ð  Fall because of global recession impacts 
on aid budgets in traditional and non-
traditional donors.  
Size of private capital flows  Ð  Fall because of global recession and 
volatility prevents investments.  
 
What does the Roller Coaster scenario mean for different types of countries? Table 22 
provides a colour-coded quick reference. For fuel exporters, this is potentially a world of good 
prospects because of rising (albeit volatile) fuel prices. Growth will be spurred by the fuel-price 
rise (though price volatility may lead to stop-start growth). Labour-demand prospects are more 
mixed if growth is fuel-led and the prolonged global recession leads to depressed export 
markets for manufacturing and services. The outlook for public budgets is good, but again it 
could be a volatile picture if fuel prices rise erratically. The prospects for income-poverty 
reduction are mixed if growth is fuel price-led, but health and education budgets could be 
expanded as a result of oil revenues. 
For fuel importers things are much less positive. 
For fuel importers with neither primary commodity export dependency nor aid dependency, the 
high fuel prices will dampen growth, which is unlikely to be offset by other export markets 
because of a global recession. Hence labour demand will be weak and public budgets under 
pressure, probably leading to potentially adverse impacts on income poverty, education and 
health indicators. 
For fuel importers with commodity dependence but without aid dependency, things are 
potentially worse because of the stagnation of non-fuel commodity prices as a result of the 
recession, in addition to the fuel-price rise. Both will dampen growth and labour demand, as well 
as depress fiscal space, potentially leading to adverse impacts on income poverty, education and 
health indicators. 
For fuel importers with commodity dependence and aid dependency, this scenario is 
potentially even worse than for the grouping above. The triple shock of fuel price rises, declining 
non-fuel commodity prices and falling aid budgets overall (even with rises in non-traditional aid) 
make this scenario particularly bleak for this group of countries. 
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TABLE 22 
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Strong economic growth   GREEN/ORANGE  RED RED  RED 
Strong labour demand   GREEN/ORANGE  RED RED  RED 
Healthy public budgets  GREEN/ORANGE  RED RED  RED 
Poverty reduction prospects 
Reduction in the dollar-a-day 
poverty headcount ratio 
GREEN/ORANGE  RED RED  RED 
Improvement in primary school 
enrolment/completion ratios 
GREEN/ORANGE  RED RED  RED 
Improvement in child and infant 
mortality rates 
GREEN/ORANGE  RED RED  RED 
Code: GREEN = positive prospects; ORANGE = mixed prospects; RED = negative prospects. 
9  CONCLUSIONS 
One of the striking implications from the country typologies is the extent to which developing 
countries mainly fall into one of two types. On the one hand, there is a small group of net fuel 
exporters; on the other, there is a much larger group of fuel importers that are also primary-
commodity export-dependent and aid-dependent. (Kenya and Jamaica sit between these, as 
commodity-dependent but not aid-dependent.)  
Because one of the strong outcomes from the initial drivers scan was that energy prices 
were likely to rise over the decade (the uncertainty was more related to the patterns associated 
with this increase), these two groups have strongly divergent futures and the scenarios are 
strongly patterned. 
The point of scenario work, however, is not just to understand and interpret the world and 
its future uncertainties. It is designed to create the space in which it is possible to adapt and 
respond. Thus each group has very different implications for policymakers and aid organisations. 
9.1  NET FUEL EXPORTERS 
At a macro level, future outcomes for the oil-producing countries are positive in all scenarios 
except Roller Coaster, where they could be unstable. Fuel-exporting countries generally 34  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
produce good outcomes at the level of the MDGs in the model, although there are risks in the 
distribution of benefits, and governance becomes even more important for these countries. 
It should be remembered, however, that the scenarios here are primarily economic in 
nature; while fuel exports will create additional income, questions remain about how that 
additional income is distributed. Much work has been done on the dangers and upheavals 
faced by countries (in Africa and further afield) that suddenly discover hitherto unidentified 
natural resources. 
Hence the need here is for governance and institutional frameworks that are sufficiently 
robust to ensure that the revenues are distributed effectively. One can imagine that NGOs will 
continue to be active in this regard, although their leverage may be limited. Only in one of the 
four scenarios can they mobilise governments or corporations that are likely to be concerned 
about governance, and even then the demand for oil and the enthusiasm for profits may 
overwhelm the better instincts of managers or shareholders. In this case, an additional focus 
on institutional capacity building from the international development community will also 
become increasingly important. 
9.2  NET FUEL IMPORTERS 
In sharp contrast, outcomes for net fuel importers are much more negative. Outcomes are 
particularly poor for countries such as Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Malawi and Mozambique, which 
are net fuel importers and are also dependent on both primary commodity exports and aid. 
For these countries, concentration on the delivery of essential aid to the poorest will 
continue to be important, as will institutional capacity building. Over the longer term, a key 
challenge for many of these countries will be the development (not surprisingly) of a more 
diversified economy, away from reliance on primary commodity exports. 
More broadly, the fuel importers have a chance to escape from their oil dependency 
through a form of African “green deal”. Reading the scenarios, there is a “leapfrogging” 
opportunity in which these countries can develop skills and technologies to build their own 
energy infrastructure, just at the point where the output/cost ratio of solar photovoltaic starts 
to become competitive. Given the paucity of their own resources, this will require external 
investment from aid partners—investment that is not focused solely on poverty reduction, but 
more broadly on promoting shovel-ready projects that bring affordable and environmentally 
sustainable energy to African communities. 
Outcomes for countries that are net fuel importers, and that have neither commodity 
export dependency nor aid dependency (a group that includes both India and China) are more 
benign. This is partly because robust growth in the BRIC countries spurs export growth and 
labour demand, and because of the better prospects for non-commodity exports such as 
finished goods and services. 
For these countries, the challenge is related more to promoting continued economic 
diversification and development in order to foster continued growth. In particular, countries in 
this category continue to have relatively high levels of energy intensity (that is, they consume a 
lot of energy per unit of GDP produced), which is a significant challenge as we move into an 
environment where the cost of energy is rising. Working Paper  35 
 
ANNEX 
FUTURE-PROOFING THE MDGS: WHAT ARE THE CRITICAL 
UNCERTAINTIES FOR 2010–2015 AND BEYOND? 
Andy Sumner*, Tom Mitchell* and Thom Tanner* 
1  THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE MDGS 
As global economic recovery begins, the short- and medium-term impacts of the crisis on the 
MDGs are beginning to become clearer. There were large falls in exports, FDI and remittances, 
but these declines were very variable and not all the expected impacts materialised. 
TABLE A1 
Macroeconomic Impacts of the Crisis 
Emerging and developing 
economies  2007  2008 2009 2010 
GDP, constant prices (annual 
% change)  8.323  6.139 2.385 6.346 
Investment as % GDP  29.216  29.733 29.044 30.215 
Gross national savings as % 
GDP  33.49  33.589 31.04 32.509 
Export volume of goods and 
services (annual % change)  9.737  4.023 -8.163 8.304 
Current account balance % 
GDP  4.24  3.742 1.799 2.078 
Private financial flows, net 
(US$ bn)  689.345  179.193 180.156 209.794 
Official flows, net  
(US$ bn)  -98.437  -116.92 80.209  -2.256 
Change in reserves (US$ bn)  -1,226.03  -666.561 -538.768  -632.36 
External debt, total debt 
service, interest (US$ bn)  165.289  164.405 141.847 134.636 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
       
GDP, constant prices (annual 
% change)  6.932  5.541 2.112 4.716 
Investment as % GDP  21.489  22.015 21.716 22.605 
Gross national savings as % 
GDP  22.648  23.311 20.288 21.572 
Export volume of goods and 
services (annual % change)  7.301  0.264 -7.022 7.004 
Current account balance % 
GDP  1.235  0.918 -2.05 -1.681 
Private financial flows, net 
(US$ bn)  26.343  24.822 18.166 40.551 
Official flows,  
net (US$ bn)  -3.776  -3.33 6.199 7.918 
Change in reserves (US$ bn)  -29.195  -17.099 8.193 -12.793 
External debt, total debt 
service, interest (US$ bn)  7.65  8.201 8.669  9.11 
Source: IMF WEO database (April 2010) at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/index.aspx>. 
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Growth slowed but there were few outright recessions. The impacts were highly nuanced 
by country. Recovery is clear enough globally and regionally in Asia and Africa, but the regional 
average masks major differences across regions. 
Given that macroeconomic impacts and recovery have been highly variable, we can 
expect poverty estimates to be similarly so. Precise estimates of MDG poverty impacts to date 
have been wide-ranging and have largely focused on growth elasticity estimations or research 
from previous crises (given the time-lags in real data collection). There is much data at the 
country level, and in May–June 2010 the UN Global Impact and Vulnerability Alert System 
(GIVAS) will start reporting new data based on numerous UN agencies’ contributions.  
The most recent global estimates (March 2010), based on the latest growth data, revise 
earlier estimates and are relevant for MDG 1, given that an additional 50 million people were 
estimated to be living on less than US$1.25/day in 2009 (or 57 million on less than US$2/day) 
and an extra 15 million in 2010 (19 million on less than US$2/day). This creates a cumulative 
impact of 64 million on less than US$1.25 (or 76 million on less than US$2/day)  
(Ravallion and Chen, 2010). 
 In terms of MDG 1 (nutrition), MDGs 2 and 3 (education) and MDGs 4, 5, 6 (health), there 
are several conclusions from previous crises (see Table A2): infant and under-five mortality are 
significantly worse during economic downturns; completion rates in primary education, 
especially for girls, also deteriorate rapidly during economic downturns; and female enrolment 
in primary and secondary education drops during contraction (Conceição et al., 2009; 
Conceição Namsuk Kim and Mendoza, 2009).  
TABLE A2 
Human Development and Gender Outcomes during Crises in Sub-Saharan Africa  
(Sample Averages during Growth Deceleration versus Otherwise) 
Indicator During  deceleration  Otherwise  Significance 
      
Life expectancy female (years)  52.26  55.02  ** 
Life expectancy male years  48.87  51.86  ** 
Life expectancy total years  50.52  53.40  ** 
      
Infant mortality rate  106.62  85.61  ** 
Under 5 mortality rate  161.3  139.40  * 
      
Primary completion females  33.83  50.37  ** 
Primary completion males  48.44  56.55  * 
Primary completion total  40.95  53.55  ** 
      
Ratio female: male in primary enrolment  77.86  87.27  ** 
**Ratio female: male in secondary enrolment  63.57  79.88  ** 
Ratio female: male in tertiary enrolment  32.52  62.31  ** 
Source: Conceição et al. (2009); Conceição and Namsuk Kim (2009). 
Notes: ** difference significant at 1 per cent level; * difference significant at 5 per cent level; under-five mortality 
average rises to 172 when three countries in conflict are included. 
 
Impacts on infant mortality (MDG 4) have also been estimated on the basis of growth 
declarations. The results range from 30,000–50,000 more infant deaths per year in Africa 
(Friedman and Schady, 2009) to 200,000-400,000 more infant deaths globally (Friedman and 
Schady, 2009; World Bank, February 2009; World Bank, August 2009). A gendered aspect  
was also noted in the estimation of an additional 1.5 male infant deaths per 1,000 live births Working Paper  37 
 
and 7.4 female infant deaths per 1,000 live births per 1 per cent growth deceleration  
(Baird et al., 2009; World Bank, February 2009).  
Indeed, much research on previous crises suggests that they have highly gendered 
impacts: women are more likely to lose employment than men because women dominate 
export sectors for garments, electronics and agricultural exports (Buvinic, 2009). Furthermore, 
girls are more likely to drop out of school in both low- and middle-income countries (Skoufias 
and Parker, 2006; Schady, 2004) and, as noted above, the infant mortality rates for girls exceed 
those for boys during a downturn (Baird et al., 2007). Given that the key focus of many MDGs is 
child poverty, a particular concern is that the poverty impacts of the crisis have long-term 
effects on children (and future generations) via lesser height, delayed school enrolment and 
reduced grade completion (Alderman et al., 2006; Yamano et al., 2005). There is also cross-
country evidence of impacts of severe psychological distress and mental health (for example, 
Das, 2008), and of elevated levels of community and intra-household conflict during and after 
a crisis (for example, Friedman and Thomas, 2007; World Bank, 2008). Cross-country, rapid-
appraisal qualitative research during the crisis (for example, Hossain et al., 2009; World Bank, 
2009) has also uncovered such non-material impacts. 
As regards recovery and the fiscal outlook, there are various MDG concerns related to  
the speed of the recovery, fiscal space and effects on public expenditure in general, social 
spending in particular, and debt service, which differ considerably across countries. Global 
growth is clear enough, judging by the estimates of the IMF World Economic Outlook (February 
2010), and recovery is very much V-shaped in developing countries (see Table A1). However, 
there was a distinct slowdown in the pace of global recovery towards the end of 2009 (judging 
by global trade data, for example) and much depends on when the monetary and fiscal 
stimulus is withdrawn. In short, sustained recovery is not guaranteed. 
There is further evidence that the crisis might have longer-lasting MDG impacts into 
2010–2015 via social spending, albeit differently across countries (see Tables A5 and A6).  
TABLE A3 
Public Expenditure Indicators/Projections, 2007-2010, Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries 
(fragile states bolded: green = positive; red = negative) 
  Public expenditure 
(in % of GDP) 
 
Government revenues 
(in % of GDP) 
 
  2007 2008 2009 2010  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Ethiopia  17.07  14.48  13.27  15.48 14.11  11.94  11.23  13.43 
Ghana 37.34  41.03  36.56  37.39  28.85  27.47  29.86  29.15 
Kenya  22.05  23.09  24.35  26.61 19.78  20.49  20.54  21.43 
Malawi 27.11  30.09  31.25  28.81  28.23  27.49  26.17  24.94 
Mozambique 23.39  24.43  25.61  29.63 19.87  21.87  23.33  24.58 
Nigeria  24.11 25.04 28.42  25.46  30.35  24.14  32.01  18.13 
Sudan  21.26  20.08  22.56  15.75  17.66 15.92 21.16  12.61 
Uganda  21.36  21.08  22.93  26.97 17.62  21.07  18.37  21.92 
Zambia  15.24  15.60  14.70  15.78 15.30  14.67  13.00  13.64 
Zambia 19.82  20.38  20.57  20.56 36.84  19.32  19.30  18.45 
Source: IMF WEO Database. 
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TABLE A4 
Trends in Debt Service in Selected African Countries  
(US$ m. Red = significant rise; green = static or fall; fragile states bolded) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 
Ethiopia  0.14 0.07 0.09  0.31 
Ghana 0.18  0.33  0.58  0.45 
Kenya  0.39 0.39 0.38  0.48 
Malawi 0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02 
Mozambique 1.31  0.68  0.82  0.83 
Nigeria  1.27 0.60 0.63  0.54 
Sudan  0.17 0.33 0.49  0.67 
Uganda  0.08 0.08 0.07  0.10 
Zambia  0.07 0.10 0.11  0.13 
Source: IMF WEO Database. 
TABLE A5 
Estimated Impacts on Total Education Spending, 2008 and 2009, Selected Countries  
(red = significant decline; green = significant rise; fragile states bolded) 
  % of GDP  % of total budget 
 2008  2009  2008  2009 
Burkino Faso  2.3  4.2 9.4 11.8 
Benin 5  4.6  18.8  17.9 
Ghana 9  5.9  21.8  17.4 
Kenya  5 5  17.2  17.4 
Mozambique 6.3  7.1 18.5 19.3 
Rwanda  3.9 4.4  16.6  16.4 
Sierra Leone  1.2  1.4 8 11.3 
Tanzania 5.6  5.6  19.7  18.3 
Uganda  2.9 3  15.3  15.3 
Zambia   4.1  4.4 15.4 17.2 
Source: Martin and Kyrili (2009). 
TABLE A6 
Estimates of Impacts on Total Health Spending, 2008 and 2009, Selected Countries  
(red = significant decline; green = significant rise; fragile states bolded) 
  % GDP (09-08)  % Budget (09-08) 
Kenya  -0.1  -0.2 
Rwanda  +0.4  +0.4 
Tanzania  -0.5  -2.7 
Uganda  +0.06  -0.2 
Source: Martin and Kyrili (2009). 
 
Fragile states in particular have been badly hit by the crisis as a result of slowing growth 
and the fiscal squeeze stemming from the economic downturn. Falls in per capita GDP growth 
were projected in 27 fragile states in 2009 and, on the basis of 2009 data estimates, 
government revenues were also expected to fall as a percentage of GDP in 21 of 32 fragile 
states (OECD, 2010). At the same time, aid is under pressure as a result of the crisis. Irish and 
Italian aid has already been cut and the OECD (2010) estimates only half of the Gleneagles 
promise of 2005 to raise aid levels by US$50 billion by 2010 will be met. Although official 
development assistance (ODA) will reach a record high in 2010, several G7 countries are not 
meeting their Gleneagles commitments, much less the European Commission’s 0.51 per cent 
aid commitments. Working Paper  39 
 
2  THE FOOD AND FUEL CRISIS  
In 2007–2008 there were some drastic increases in food and fuel prices. Although food and fuel 
prices in general have fallen in 2009–2010, they remain higher than before 2007.  
The 2010–2015 outlook is for higher food prices. The OECD/FAO estimates are 10–20 per 
cent higher food prices over the next 10 years (compared to 2010), with fuel prices (vegetable 
oil) 30 per cent higher. This is because of expected higher oil prices. Climate change is also 
likely to play a role in food-price rises because of changes in the weather and drops in yields  
in South Asia and Southern Africa. There could be another global price spike if oil prices rose 
suddenly again or if droughts, floods or conflict led to higher food prices. In late 2009 there 
were such concerns in the Horn of Africa and South Asia. 
Jaspars and Wiggins (2009) argue that the price spike was due to increased demand from 
China and India; a slowdown in the growth of cereal production since the 1980s and a series of 
harvest failures from 2005 onwards; the rising price of oil, which increased fertiliser costs and 
thus stimulated biofuel production; and various countries’ restrictions on grain exports. Food 
prices fell in late 2007 and 2008 because of increased production in the OECD countries and a 
drastic fall in oil prices. Although wheat and maize fell to pre-crisis levels, rice remains 80 per 
cent higher. It is important to track food prices, not least because domestic prices of staples in 
many countries are higher than changes in the global grain price as a result of local factors 
such as conflict, supply disruptions and weather. 
This has implications not only for the nutrition-related MDGs; across the MDGs, nutrition 
matters. It matters not only in its own right and as regards the nutrition- and health-related 
MDGs, but it also plays a large role in education and other MDGs.
 Even before the food crisis, 
one in three infants in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa were chronically malnourished. In 
South Asia, the number of children under five who are low weight-for-age or low height-for-
age is steadily declining (though still rising in several countries), but in Sub-Saharan Africa the 
number is steadily increasing even at the regional level. Child malnutrition is responsible for 
half of all child deaths, and infant and maternal malnutrition are leading causes of disease. 
Indeed, the Lancet series on Child Survival (2003) and on Maternal and Child under-nutrition 
(2008) identified the main cause of death among children younger than five years from 
preventable causes (diarrhoea, pneumonia, measles, malaria, HIV/AIDS), identifying the 
underlying causes of under-nutrition (Jones et al., 2009).
 At a national level, the higher costs of 
imported food can drain foreign exchange, lead to inflation and reduce economic growth. 
Food accounts for 50–90 per cent of poor families’ budgets, so changes in food prices 
matter. When food prices rise, poor families adjust the quantity and quality of the food they 
consume (as well as healthcare and schooling). The nutritional impacts on young children and 
pregnant women can be severe. The priority period is while the child is in the womb and up to 
18 months of age. Malnutrition losses incurred during this period cannot be retrieved by 
interventions after the first 18 months of life; they are losses that the child will carry 
throughout life. Of the female babies that survive, those that remain malnourished in 
adolescence are more likely to give birth to malnourished children. 
Although one might think that higher food prices will help poor farmers, a surprising 
number of rural households are net buyers of staple foods (about 60 per cent in Bangladesh, 
Kenya and Mozambique, for example). In many countries, only a minority of farmers have land 
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exporters in the 1970s to being net importers in recent years. The food-price increases have 
been well documented and assessed in research. The food riots in more than 20 countries were 
a highly visible consequence. There was a severe price spike in 2008, but food prices had been 
rising since 2000 (see Table A7). 
TABLE A7 
Price Rises in Key Caloric Food Items, 2008–2009 




Mozambique   Cassava  33%  61%   
Dem. Rep. Congo  Cassava  55%  60%   
Sudan Sorghum  26%  38%   
Kenya Maize  36%  21%  16% 
Chad Sorghum  18%  18%   
Burkina Faso  Sorghum  27%  15%   
Tanzania Maize  27%  14%  23% 
Source: World Bank, Feb 2010, Food Price Watch. 
There are numerous estimates of the nutritional impacts of food-price increases, such as 
Tiwari and Zaman (2010), who concluded that their preferred estimate relates to a 35 per cent 
price-increase scenario (average food-price change 2007–2008) and a partial pass-through of 
prices (the price shock faced by domestic consumers is 80 per cent of the price shock in the 
international markets). This implies 64 million more undernourished people. A 50 per cent 
increase implies 146 million more undernourished people (see Table A8). Tiwari and Zaman 
have also estimated country impacts on the basis of actual increases in the prices of food 
staples (see Table A9). 
TABLE A8 
Food Price Scenarios in 2008 and Impact on Global and Regional Undernourishment (millions) 
  Baseline 
(FAO, 2007) 
35% increase food prices 
2007-8 and “partial pass 
through” 
50% increase food prices 
2007-8 and “full pass 
through” 
Sub-Saharan Africa  236  246.4  253.4 
Asia and Pacific  583  628.6  695.5 
Latin America and Caribbean  51  57.0  63.2 
Middle East and North Africa  37  42.5  48.5 
Total 923  986.5  1069.4 
Source: Tiwari and Zaman (2010, forthcoming). 
TABLE A9 
Food Price Scenarios in 2009 and Impact on Undernourishment in Selected Countries 
 
Increase in price  
domestic staple 2009 
Change in undernourishment 
incidence (millions) 
Mozambique 61%  763,291 
Kenya 21%  453,897 
Burkina Faso  15%  149,592 
Tanzania 14%  444,599 
Tiwari and Zaman (2010, forthcoming). 
 
There have been several global meetings to discuss policy responses to the food crisis, 
and in April 2008 the United Nations established the High Level Task Force on the global food 
security crisis, which led to the Comprehensive Framework for Action. In June 2009, 
representatives of 180 countries met in Rome. The emerging consensus is a “twin-track 
approach”, which Sanogo (2010) notes is based on: Working Paper  41 
 
1)  Measures to meet the immediate food needs of the vulnerable, via: 
•  emergency food assistance; 
•  safety nets; 
•  the provision of agricultural inputs and services; 
•  adjustments in trade and tax policy; and 
•  steps to manage the macroeconomic implications of price rises. 
 
2)  Measures to build long-term resilience, via: 
•  increased food production, especially by small farmers; 
•  managing food stocks more effectively; 
•  adopting less ambitious targets for biofuels production; and  
•  systematic social protection. 
 
Social protection systems—the real insurance for future crises—are essential. The good 
news is that the crisis and the post-crisis context have created greater policy space for those 
advocating social protection systems. Social protection programmes such as cash transfers 
have attracted international attention because of the strong evidence that they have positive 
benefits for the educational, health and nutritional MDG outcomes of millions of poor children, 
especially girls, by targeting cash payments at the caregiver (usually the mother) and providing 
greater incentives for girls’ schooling.  
Social protection is a set of actions and policies that partly reflect existing social policy, 
but that add some new components (such as cash transfers) and are specifically directed at 
helping households to manage risk and to reduce the incidence and impact of shocks. Bapu 
Vaitla et al. (2008) and Davies and McGregor (2009) go further to develop a notion of 
transformative social protection and “graduation” out of poverty (see Table A10). 
TABLE A10 
Types of Social Protection (SP) Instruments and Role during Current Crisis 
  Type of SP  SP instruments  Role in Crisis 




Immediate protection and 
relief from poverty and 
deprivation 




Social insurance (pensions, health 
insurance, unemployment benefit) 
Livelihood diversification 
Savings clubs; funeral societies 
Prevents damage to coping 
strategies  
 Promotive  (economic 
opportunities) 
Social transfers 
Access to credit 
Asset transfers/protection 
school feeding 
Starter packs  
Access to common property resources 
Public works programmes 
Promotes resilience through 
livelihood diversification and 
improves security  
Long-term Transformative  (addressing 
underlying social 
vulnerabilities) 
Promotion of minority rights 
Anti-discrimination campaigns 
Social funds 
Transforms social relations 
To reduce exclusion  
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What is new about social protection is treating exposure to various risks by means of a 
systems approach. Social protection thus allows poor/vulnerable families to take more risks 
and invest; helps poor/vulnerable families to develop human capital; and allows families to 
avoid negative coping mechanisms. 
For LICs, and indeed for all countries, periodic crises are likely to be the ”new normal”. 
These crises will be compound: climatic, economic, fragile states and so on. Key to these crises 
is uncertainty over who will be hit and when. We thus need to think of social protection as a 
system, not as components. Addressing each crisis as it comes is ineffective and inefficient, and 
the crisis may have passed by the time there is a response. A systems approach does not mean 
one single, universal programme; it means viewing the collectivity of programmes as a system. 
Social protection has developed extensively in LICs during the last ten years. In Africa, the 
largest programmes are in Ethiopia and South Africa but pilot schemes, some large, are 
emerging in Kenya, Zambia and Ghana.  
Moreover, there is a lot more evidence now about what sorts of programmes are most 
effective and how to target and improve the livelihoods of different groups. There is also 
strong evidence linking a range of social protection interventions to the nutrition, education 
and health MDGs in a wide range of countries (see review of Sumner, 2010). It is still the case, 
however, that few of these schemes are long-term or at scale. This is due to various factors, in 
particular that the schemes have large administrative start-up costs, that capacity to 
implement them is limited, and that the domestic demand from governments evident in Latin 
America is less visible elsewhere. One proposal to overcome these impediments is a “resilience 
compact/contract”. Donors might pay the upfront start-up costs on condition that 
governments agree budget lines to fund annual spending; civil society organisations could 
monitor and evaluate effectiveness in reaching the poor and the poorest, and prepare an 
annual “MDG resilience report”. Although some countries will face fiscal constraints over the 
next few years, various mechanisms of “new aid” are evolving. 
3  MDGs AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Climate change presents a range of MDG challenges (see Tables A11 and A12).  
TABLE A11 
Selected Examples of Current and Projected Climate-Change Impacts on Industry, Settlement 
and Society, and Their Interaction with Other Processes  
Climate driven 
phenomena 








a. Changes in extremes 
Tropical cyclones, 
storm surge 












Increased vulnerability in 
storm-prone coastal 
areas; possible effects on 
settlements, health, 




activities; regions and 
populations with 













Similar to coastal 
storms plus drainage 
infrastructure. 
Similar to coastal storms 
plus drainage 
infrastructure. 
Similar to coastal 
storms. 
Heat- or cold-waves  Effects on human 
health; social stability; 
requirements for 
energy, water and 
other services (e.g. 
water or food storage); 
infrastructure (e.g. 
energy transportation) 





Increased vulnerabilities in 
some regions and 
populations; health 
effects; changes in energy 
requirements. 
Mid-latitude areas: 
elderly, very young 
and/or very poor.  
Drought Water  availability; 
livelihoods, energy 
generation, migration, 








challenges in affected 
areas; shifts in locations of 
population and economic 
activities; add. 
investments in water 
supply. 
Semi-arid and arid 





b. Changes in means      
Temperature Energy  demands  and 
costs; urban air quality; 
thawing of permafrost 
soils; tourism and 
recreation; retail 
consumption; 









Shifts in energy demand; 
worsening of air quality; 
impacts on settlements 
and livelihoods depending 
on meltwater; threats to 
settlements/infrastructure 
from thawing permafrost 
soils in some regions. 
Very diverse, but 
greater vulnerabilities 
in places and 
populations with more 
limited capacities and 
resources for 
adaptation. 
Precipitation Agricultural  livelihoods; 








Depending on the region, 
vulnerabilities in some 
areas to effects of 
precipitation increases 
(e.g. flooding but could be 
positive) and in some 
areas to decreases. 
Poor regions and 
populations. 




Trends in coastal 
development, 
settlements and land 
uses. 
Long-term increases in 
vulnerabilities of low-lying 
coastal areas. 
Same as above. 
Source: IPCC (2007). 
TABLE A12 
MDGs 1–7 and Climate Change-Relevant Poverty Impacts 
Millennium Development Goals  Climate change relevant poverty impacts  
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger  Climate change is likely to impact on poor people’s livelihoods and 
food security by: 
1.  Reducing poor people’s livelihood assets 
2.  Altering path and rate of economic growth 
3.  Undermining food security  
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education 
 
4.  Destruction of schools/other assets by extreme events 
5.  Loss of livelihoods – reduced school attendance 
6.  Disaster-related migration of families 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women 
 
Reduced agricultural productivity/disasters can: 
Burden women’s health; Limit women’s time to participate in 
decision-making/income generation activities; Reduce livelihood 
assets for women 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality  
Goal 5: Improve maternal health  
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Climate change-induced extreme weather events are likely to result 
in higher prevalence of vector- and water-borne diseases, declining 
food security and decreased availability of potable water 
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability  Climate change will directly impact on natural resources, 
ecosystems and the earth’s natural cycles. This is predicted to 
reduce the quality and quantity of natural resources and 
ecosystems. 
Source: Urban and Sumner (2009). 
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Stern (2009a: 75) suggests thinking of “development in a more hostile climate”. 
Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub (2010) estimate the cost of “climate-resilient” MDGs to be 
about a third higher than the conventional cost of meeting the MDGs—about US$100 billion a 
year for the next decade, compared to US$72 billion a year for the MDGs alone. Extra costs 
arise from having to provide more development support (for example, extra bed nets against 
malaria), the same support at a higher cost (for example, more expensive infrastructure), as 
well as new measures altogether (for example, adaptive capacity building). Climate change can 
also lead to the prioritisation of certain measures compared to the baseline development plan 
(for example, disaster management). In one of the better-known estimates of adaptation costs 
(UNDP, 2007), about half of the costs arise from social protection programmes that mitigate 
the adverse social impacts of climate shocks. 
Poor countries and poor people living in them tend to be more seriously affected, but 
have reduced assets and capacities with which to cope with and adapt to impacts (Kates, 2000; 
Stern, 2007; Mitchell and Tanner, 2009). For example, some of the most widely cited trends for 
Africa include: a drop in agricultural yields by as much as 50 per cent by 2020; an additional 
70–250 million Africans at risk of increased water stress from climate change; an extra 40–60 
million Africans exposed to malaria; and rising sea levels that may severely affect mangrove 
forests as well as coastal fisheries, and lead to increased severe flooding (Boko et al., 2007; 
Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub, 2009; Stern, 2007). 
Such scenarios have prompted a flurry of activities to integrate adaptation into 
development and poverty reduction programmes, often linking to communities of practice  
in disaster-risk reduction, sustainable livelihood approaches and vulnerability assessment 
(Yamin et al., 2005). The injustice of impacts are felt hardest by those who have done least  
to contribute to the problem, framing adaptation as an equity and rights issue  
(Mitchell and Tanner, 2009).  
As regards the MDGs, although some of the impacts of climate change may not occur 
until after 2015, there is a need to “climate-proof” the MDGs so that MDG gains are not wiped 
out and the medium-term pathway is consistent with adaptation. Climate change may impact 
MDG-related concerns in numerous ways, such as through greater volatility in agricultural 
production as a result of a greater variability in the weather, including more frequent and 
intense droughts. This will mean changes in wage rates and income, as well as seasonality in 
income and consumption. “Hunger seasons” (see Bapu Vaitla et al., 2008) may become more 
pronounced and some relatively well-populated areas that already have semi-arid climates 
(such as Southern Africa, Northeast Brazil and northern Mexico) are likely to become drier. 
Water scarcity in such cases will be exacerbated.  
Another climate impact on the MDGs is via more frequent and more severe disasters 
such as storms and tsunamis: the poor often live on marginal land with limited resilience to 
extreme weather. Homes and other assets such as livestock and possessions may be lost,  
and in the aftermath of major events there are high risks of water-borne and insect-borne 
diseases. Changed climates, in turn, are likely to affect ecosystems, with shifts in the range 
and distribution of flora and fauna. In some cases, this may mean that insects as disease 
vectors spread to previously unaffected areas, as may happen with an advance of malaria 
into higher altitudes.  Working Paper  45 
 
The likely impact of the above is significant migration, particularly urban migration  
(see below). This will have significant implications for the MDG-related concerns, as will 
natural-resource conflicts and changing livelihoods. 
There is a growing acknowledgment that a process of “adaptation” is central to sustaining 
and accelerating MDG progress or “climate-proofing” the MDGs. Although initially secondary 
to mitigation, adaptation is now a central strand of national and international climate policy 
(UNFCCC, 2007). What does pro-poor or pro-MDG adaptation look like? Mitchell and Tanner 
(2009) argue that there is a need to consider pro-poor adaptation by types of poverty  
(chronic and transient) in order to build suitable adaptive processes and adaptation options  
for the poor to pursue different pathways out of poverty (see Table A13).  
TABLE A13 
Types of Pro-Poor Adaptation 
Type of adaptation 
Chronic poor  Transient poor 
Always poor  Usually poor  Cyclical poor  Occasionally poor 
Autonomous adaptation 
Conflict, crime, sex 
work 
Selling of last assets 
Intra-community 
transfers/charity 
Sending children to 
work 
Seasonal migration 
Working multiple jobs, 
longer hours 
Diversify livelihoods 
Investment in social 
capital/ assets 
Market-based 




























urban service provision 
Source: Mitchell and Tanner (2009). 
 
Pro-poor adaptation seeks to assess how climate change may affect routes in and out of 
chronic poverty. It also seeks to expose opportunities presented by climate change for those in 
chronic poverty. This could include changes to ecosystems that make them more productive 
and offer a greater range of environmental assets. Despite food security concerns, transitions 
to labour-intensive biofuel crops may provide new employment options. Opportunities are 
most likely to emerge through adaptation interventions and institutional strengthening that 
target the poorest groups, funded by rising flows of adaptation finance. 
Indeed, Davies et al. (2008) have linked social protection directly to pro-poor climate 
adaptation in “adaptive social protection”. This entails addressing climate change 
vulnerabilities by social protection mechanisms that improve the ability of agriculture to 
increase productivity in a changing climate and that support diversification of livelihoods away 
from climate-sensitive livelihood activities, particularly in areas prone to severe droughts or 
floods. For the latter, adaptive social protection for farmers could mean moving to off-farm 
activities, for which social protection measures could include promoting off-farm rural 
enterprise and industry, investment in urban services, assisted migration and improved 
remittance schemes.  
Adaptive social protection is not just a matter of moving people out of agriculture. In the 
agricultural sector itself, social protection measures that could build resilience to climate 
change and benefit from integrating climate-change adaptation include: weather-indexed 46  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
insurance, asset restocking (including direct livestock provision) and cash transfers. 
Programmes introducing duck rearing in flood-prone areas or camel rearing in drought-prone 
areas can help build climate resilience into livelihood asset building. Breed selection is also a 
crucial component of such initiatives. In Bangladesh, for instance, the introduction of a 
selection of duck species that are more capable of living with less water, are better suited to 
higher temperatures and consume readily available non-aquatic vegetation aims to build 
climate resilience. 
TABLE A14 
Linking Social Protection and Adaptation to Climate Change 
Approach to social protection  Benefits for adaptation 
Provision  Prevention of those most vulnerable to climate risks who have 
low levels of adaptive capacity. 
Prevention  Prevents damaging coping strategies as a result of risks to 
weather-dependent livelihoods. 
Promotion  Promotes resilience through livelihood diversification and 
security in order to withstand climate-related shocks. 
Promotes opportunities arising from climate change. 
Transformation  Transforms social relations to help address underlying social 
and political vulnerability. 
Source: Davies et al. (2008). 
 
This brings to light a broader note: climate change and the MDGs need to be seen as the 
same policy arena across all development policy, and need to be addressed in an integrated 
manner. In much of the discourse the two are still treated as separate, and adaptation is often 
seen as an “bolt on” to business as usual, although this is increasingly challenged (Fankhauser 
and Schmidt-Traub, 2009; Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008; Fankhauser, 2010; UNFCCC, 2007; 
and World Bank, 2009b on adaptation costs; and World Bank, 2009a on adaptation finance; 
Mitchell and Tanner, 2009). This separation of climate change and the MDGs is visible in the 
negotiations leading up to the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen, which largely 
treated financing for climate-change adaptation as distinct from development finance and as 
falling under the purview of Ministers of the Environment (Schmidt-Traub, 2009). The main 
practical instruments to advance adaptation planning in least developed countries under the 
UNFCCC—the National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs)—are generally developed in 
parallel to national development strategies, poverty reduction strategies and associated 
medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs) that form the basis for providing and 
programming international development assistance (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008).  
The integration of climate change and the MDGs is essential at an operational level  
because if adaptation policy is not integrated into countries’ expenditure and  
macroeconomic frameworks, it is difficult for finance ministries and central banks  
to manage the increased inflow of foreign currencies.  
While it is clear that climate-change adaptation and mitigation need to cut across all 
poverty reduction efforts, low-carbon development (LCD) debates to date have been mainly 
about high- and middle-income countries. There are good reasons why even the poorest 
countries with low emissions might be interested in pursuing LCD (Urban, 2010; Urban and 
Sumner, 2009). General discussions about the limits of decoupling growth from emissions are 
fraught (for details see Barrett et al., 2008; Ockwell, 2008), but many case studies argue that Working Paper  47 
 
low-carbon growth is possible—for example, in China (IEA, 2002), India (World Bank, 2008), 
South Africa (Government of South Africa, 2008) and Mexico (Project Catalyst, 2008).  
LICs have contributed least to climate change. For them, LCD is not about cutting 
emissions, but about the benefits and opportunities LCD can bring. For example, fossil fuel 
resources such as oil are costly and can lead to a “carbon lock-in”, with infrastructure and 
investments bound to a carbon-intensive economy for decades. Relying on those resources, 
therefore, can mean greater costs in the long run. Moreover, the emission-trading scheme 
under the UNFCCC has introduced a price for carbon. Having a high price attached to carbon 
could mean a competitive disadvantage for LICs in relation to global markets.  
The types of appropriate policy measures will differ for different country income groups, 
as well as by resource availability. Countries with high fossil fuel resources usually tend mainly 
to promote so-called “cleaner” fossil energy that emits fewer greenhouse gas emissions than 
conventional coal and oil (such as natural gas or fossil fuel power plants with carbon capture 
and storage). Countries with low fossil fuel resources usually tend mainly to promote 
renewable energy. Forest resource availability can also be important: countries with large 
forest resources tend to aim to achieve LCD through climate-friendly forest and land-use 
management.  
There are several UNFCCC mechanisms for LCD (see Table A15).  
TABLE A15 
Low-Carbon Development (LCD) Mechanisms 
Mechanisms  What is it? 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)  Developed countries implement projects leading to emission 
reductions in developing countries. Developing countries gain 
access to climate-friendly technology, developed countries 
gain emission reduction credits to offset their emissions. 
Emission Trading (EM)  Mechanism that sets a cap on greenhouse gas emissions and 
introduces a trading system. Once emission allowances are 
exceeded, emission credits must be bought from those that 
have emitted less. Emission trading is currently in place for 
developed countries only, but might be extended to a global 
level in the future. 
Joint Implementation (JI)  Developed countries can invest in emission reduction projects 
in other developed countries as an alternative to reducing 
emissions domestically. JI is currently in place for developed 
countries only. 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD) and Land Use, Land Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF) 
Currently under discussion in relation to a future climate 
change agreement. Developing countries could be paid for 
climate-friendly forest and land use management; developed 
countries could gain emission reduction credits to offset their 
emission obligations. 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAS)   The purpose of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions is to 
outline national mitigation options that are in line with domestic 
policies and are developed in “the context of sustainable 
development, supported and enabled by technology, financing 
and capacity building, in a measurable, reportable and 
verifiable manner” (IEA/OECD 2009).  
Source: Urban and Sumner (2009). 
 
Currently, only the Clean Development Mechanism is accessible for developing countries. 
The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will end in 2012 and a new climate-change 
agreement will be needed for the post-2012 era. Mechanisms for LCD will be a crucial issue for 
a new climate agreement. Further, LCD needs to be pursued in a pro-poor or pro-MDG manner. 
Key policies for pro-poor LCD can be drawn by linking pro-poor growth debates (see 48  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
discussion in McKay and Sumner, 2008; Sumner and Tiwari, 2009) with LCD debates (Barrett et 
al., 2008; NIES, 2006; Ockwell, 2008; Urban, 2010). Examples include green redistributive 
policies, whereby government revenues made by “green” industries are distributed to pro-
poor sectors such as health and education; support for specific sectors that are crucial for the 
poor, such as agriculture and forestry; social protection for adaptation and combining the 
synergies between mitigation and adaptation, such as social protection measures to reduce 
vulnerability to climate change; community participation opportunities such as rural 
electrification with renewable energy; “green” job creation via development of the finance 
sector and increased investments in small-scale infrastructure and pro-poor forest and land-
use policies: reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) and land use, 
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) are two possible mechanisms whereby payments from 
developed countries are directed to developing countries for climate-friendly forest and land-
use management, and thus could benefit the poor by ensuring that smaller farmers and 
foresters can engage in the carbon market. 
4  THE MDGs AND DEMOGRAPHY/URBANISATION 
In 2007, for the first time in history, half of the world’s population lived in urban areas. 
Urbanisation is one of the most important demographic shifts worldwide of the past and coming 
century. The size, form, structure and function of urban areas, as well as their future growth 
trajectories, will be critical elements in pursuing the MDGs in the period 2010–2015. This is 
particularly true for developing nations, where urban growth rates are highest (see Tables A16 
and A17), and where cities absorb an average of 5 million new residents every month and are 
responsible for 95 percent of the world’s population growth (UN Habitat, 2008: xi).  
Demographic issues relate to population growth, fertility, ageing, labour-force changes, 
dependency ratios and the demographic transition over the medium term. Over the short term 
and in the period 2010–2015, urbanisation is arguably the most fundamental demographic 
issue. Between 2010 and 2015 there will be an additional 0.38 billion people in less developed 
countries (0.74 billion by 2020), of which 0.33 billion will be new urban dwellers (or 0.67 billion 
new urban dwellers by 2020). 
TABLE A16 
Population Indicators, 2005–2020 
 







Population (billions), medium variant 
World 6.51  6.91  7.30  7.67  0.39  0.76 
Less developed  5.30  5.67  6.05  6.41  0.38  0.74 
Least developed  0.76  0.85  0.95  1.06  0.14  0.21 
Africa 0.92  1.03  1.15  1.28  0.12  0.25 
Asia 3.94  4.17  4.39  4.60  0.22  0.43 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
0.56 0.59 0.62 0.65  0.03  0.06 
Population growth rate (%) 
 2000-2005  2005-2010  2010-2015  2015-2020    
World 1.26  1.18  1.11  1.00  -  - 
Less developed  1.47  1.37  1.28  1.15  -  - 
Least developed  2.36  2.30  2.22  2.08  -  - 
Africa 2.34  2.29  2.20  2.03  -  - 
Asia 1.25  1.14  1.05  0.92  -  - 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
1.31 1.12 0.99 0.86  -  - 
                → 
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Dependency ratio (%) 
 2005  2010  2015  2020    
World   55  53  52  52  -  - 
Less developed  57  54  52  52  -  - 
Least developed  80  76  72  69  -  - 
Africa 80  78  75  72  -  - 
Asia 53  49  48  48  -  - 
Latin America/ 
Caribbean 
56 53 50 48 - - 
Source: World Population Prospects, 2008 revision at <http://esa.un.org/unpp/>. 
 
TABLE A17 
Urban Population, 2005 and 2030 
 







Urban population (billion) 
World  3.16 3.49 3.84 4.21  0.35  0.72 
Less  developed  2.26 2.57 2.90 3.24  0.33  0.67 
Least  developed  0.21 0.25 0.31 0.38  0.06  0.13 
Africa  0.35 0.41 0.48 0.57  0.07  0.16 
Asia  1.57 1.77 1.99 2.21  0.22  0.44 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
0.43 0.47 0.51 0.54  0.04  0.07 
Percentage urban (%) 
World  48.6 50.6 52.7 54.9  -  - 
Less  developed  42.7 45.3 47.9 50.5  -  - 
Least  developed  27.0 29.4 32.1 35.0  -  - 
Africa  37.9 39.9 42.2 44.6  -  - 
Asia  39.7 42.5 45.3 48.1  -  - 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
77.5 79.4 80.9 82.3  -  - 
Source: World Urbanization Prospects, 2007 revision at <http://esa.un.org/unup/>. 
 
Available data suggest that in a large number of the world’s poorest countries, the 
proportion of urban poor is increasing faster than the overall rate of urban population growth 
(Cohen, 2006: 64). This is compounded by the fact that urban poverty is often underestimated, 
because official statistics often underreport it. Note that while much of the current debate on 
cities focuses on the formidable problems of the world’s largest urban agglomerations, most 
urban dwellers continue to live in far smaller urban settlements.  
High rates of overall population growth and significant rural-urban migration have 
contributed to this rapid urbanisation and to the related, unplanned expansion of low-income 
settlements on the outskirts of many large cities or slums, without a concomitant expansion of 
public services and facilities. Currently, one of every three people living in the cities of the 
developing world lives in a slum (UN-Habitat, 2008: 90). In the developing countries, 0.8 billion 
people (in 2005) or a third of urban residents are slum dwellers (defined as those urban 
dwellers who lack improved water, improved sanitation or durable housing, or who live in 
households with more than three people per room). Prevalence is highest in sub-Saharan 
Africa, where 62 per cent of urban residents are slum dwellers (UN-Habitat, 2008: 90). 
Despite the challenges urbanisation presents to the MDGs, and the importance of MDG 7d 
to improving the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020, urbanisation has not 
received the attention it requires. The speed and scale of the growth of the world’s largest 
cities and metropolitan areas could place enormous pressure on the immediate and 50  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
surrounding environment, posing significant challenges for sustainable development and 
undermining progress towards MDG 7b on the reduction of biodiversity loss (UNFPA, 2009: 
19). The improper planning of urban sprawl adds to environmental degradation, and to farm 
and forest loss. This is the case of several Latin American cities, where sizeable damage has 
been caused to environmentally sensitive areas. These include Panama City and its Canal Zone, 
Caracas in Venezuela and its adjacent coastline, San José in Costa Rica and its mountainous 
area, and Brazil’s São Paulo and its water basins (UN-Habitat, 2010). 
Cities in many developing countries will also continue to discharge ever increasing 
amounts of waste into the air or into bodies of freshwater, threatening water quality and 
aquatic ecosystems. Congestion in many large cities poses the severe problem of increased air 
pollution. While motor vehicles are the main cause of pollution in cities, increased demand for 
energy to run air conditioning systems and electrical appliances will increasingly contribute to 
pollution in many cities. Currently, cities generate close to 80 per cent of global carbon dioxide 
emissions (Galea and Vlahov, 2005: 346). 
Demographic and health-survey data collected between 1990 and 2007 show that serious 
malnutrition is widespread in the urban slums of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and children in the poorest income brackets are malnourished at twice the rate of their 
counterparts in the richest ones (UN-Habitat, 2010). If the issue is not properly addressed, the 
growth of cities and thus of urban slums could jeopardise progress towards reducing hunger 
and malnutrition, and to meeting MDG 1. Because poorer neighbourhoods can have 
dramatically lower levels of basic services (associated with insufficient access to clean drinking 
water, inadequate sewerage facilities and insufficient solid waste disposal), the growth of 
urban centres will also greatly increase the chance that communicable and non-communicable 
diseases will spread.  
As mentioned earlier, although the unchecked and unplanned increase in cities could 
greatly undermine countries’ progress towards the MDGs, a better-managed urbanisation 
could also play an important role in MDG progress and acceleration: cities create jobs, attract 
businesses, and bring together the resources to generate new ideas, innovations and the 
increasingly productive use of technology. 
Recent research shows a positive link between economic development and urbanisation in 
most countries in Africa and Asia (Leon, 2007; Brockerhoff, 2000; UN-Habitat, 2010; Arimah, 
2010), and people in urban areas generally have greater potential access to jobs and services 
than their rural counterparts. In other words, despite the real urban threats to health, on balance 
cities in the developing world have advantages that are not available to many rural dwellers. For 
governments it is easier and cheaper per head to provide services (however limited) to people 
living in cities than to the rural poor who are often dispersed over vast geographic areas. 
Furthermore, the growth of urban populations over the past few decades has had a multiplier 
effect on the impact of immunisation and oral rehydration therapy, by increasing the proportion 
of children who are readily accessible because they live in towns and cities. Cities are also 
generally associated with a high level of contraceptive use (Brockerhoff, 2000: 4). 
Improved transportation could expand the range of housing and livelihood options for 
the urban poor, provide work, and stimulate the private sector. In the past, investments in 
infrastructure and basic services for the poorest have drastically reduced urban poverty levels 
(UN-Habitat, 2010). Working Paper  51 
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monitoring-report>,< http://www.foresightfordevelopment.org>,<www.sampnode.org.za>, USNIC, 
<www.foresight.gov.uk>, <www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_project.html> and <www.ifs.du.edu>. 
2. For more detail on “wicked problems”, see J. Chapman, C. Edwards and S. Hampson (2009), ‘Connecting the 
Dots’, Demos website, <http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Connecting_the_dots_-_web-2.pdf?1259947418>.  
3. For a more detailed overview of one version of morphological based scenarios, see G. Coyle (2000), ‘Field 
Anomaly Relaxation (FAR)’, United Nations University Millennium Project. 
4. The word “dependency” is perhaps problematic but it is the used extensively in defining commodity and aid 
relationships by UNCTAD, and the OECD-DAC. 
5. Take for example, the well-known OECD (2003: 111) volume, Harmonising Practices for Effective Aid Delivery, which 
defines high aid dependency as aid (net ODA) greater than 9 per cent of GNI and low aid dependency as under 3 
per cent. The middle group, apparently, is inconclusive in terms of results. UNCTAD (2008: 26) notes on the (mean) 
average ODA as a  per cent of GNI in all least developed countries as 7.9 per cent of GNI. Maxwell (2006:1) identifies 
“the 20 per cent club” and the “0.2 per cent club”. In the former “aid accounts for around 20 per cent of GDP… 
[which is] indicative rather than statistically precise … 20 per cent is the average aid/GNP figure for sub-Saharan 
Africa and 0.2 per cent is the aid/GNP ratio for India” [in 2003, according to UNDP 2005]. The best indicator of aid 
dependency would be ODA/Final Absorption, (Absorption = Household consumption + Investment spending + 
government consumption), which shows the share of total spending on final goods and services effectively 
"financed" by ODA.  International
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